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DO LENDERS STILL MONITOR? 








It was once conventional wisdom that lenders routinely influenced 
co po a e manage  deci ion making. Covenants constrained borrower risk 
taking and compelled specific affirmative obligations to protect lenders. 
Recent policy discussion, however, laments loan ma ke  n o various 
forms of high-risk lending. So-called leveraged loans relatively risky, 
below-investment-grade loans more than doubled in outstanding dollar 
terms, growing from about $550 billion in 2010 to $1.2 trillion by 2019. 
These risky loans have taken up a larger and larger share of the loan markets 
over time. More leveraged loans are also co enan -li e,  i ed i ho  
traditional financial maintenance covenants. And regulators worry about 
add-back bo o e  g o ing p ac ice of making p a d adj men  o 
projected earnings that tend to weaken leverage constraints. 
Mo eo e , bank eg la o  change  ha e incen i i ed o igina e-to-
di ib e  loan ndica ion  that enable non-bank lenders to hold and trade 
leveraged loans too risky for banks to keep. Syndicated lending now involves 
g ea e  and g ea e  pa icipa ion b  nonbank o  in i ional  lende  like 
hedge funds, CLOs (collateralized loan obligations), and mutual funds. 
Commentators worry about the new species of risky loans, with their dearth 
of traditional covenants and the fewer instances of lender intervention, which 
may portend instability in debt markets. At the same time, weakened 
covenant protections may lead to weakened corporate governance. 
In this Article, I respond to these fears, arguing that they may be 
overblown. The increasing share of leveraged and covenant-lite loans may 
not necessarily evidence undisciplined debt issuance. Many seemingly 
troublesome loans are issued as subparts of deals that include loans with 
traditional covenants and cross-default provisions, which effectively 
constrain borrower behavior. Though add-backs may increase firm leverage, 
they may also improve the informativeness of earnings-based financial 
covenants. In addition, while the incidence of loan covenant violations has 
dropped dramatically across U.S. public firms, recent research suggests that 
covenants have become more efficient. In effect, covenants are doing more 
with less. Financial covenants have generally become less restrictive and 
more discriminating in differentiating distress from non-distress situations. 
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DO LENDERS STILL MONITOR?: 








Forty-odd years ago, financial economists began to teach us about the 
important interactions between capital structure and corporate governance, 
explaining h  he c e of fi m  deb  con ac  ma e  fo  co po a e 
governance.1 The finance literature continues to document the ways that 
various features of lending contracts constrain manage  beha io . Lenders 
routinely influence corporate decision making, even outside the distress 
context. The pervasiveness of lender influence in public companies suggests 
that lender constraints loan covenants may often substitute for or 
complement conventional corporate governance.2 Banks may be better real-
time monitors of corporate decision making than corporate boards, which do 
not enjoy the regular stream of information that banks receive. Banks enjoy 
enormous advantages over other outsiders e en he bo o e  fi m  o ide 
directors in e m  of acce  o he fi m  manage  and p i a e info ma ion.3 
The beneficent effects of bank monitoring on firm value have been well 
 
1 E.g., Clifford W. Smith, Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Fnancial Contracting, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117 (1979). 
2 Conventional internal and external corporate governance mechanisms independent boards and markets 
for corporate control, for example may be less critical in the presence of bank lending, since bank 
monitoring can substitute for these governance mechanisms. Steven S. Byers, L. Paige Fields & Donald R. 
Fraser, Are Corporate Governance and Bank Monitoring Substitutes: Evidence from the Perceived Value of 
Bank Loans, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 475, 476 (2008) (finding that loan announcements are more likely to generate 
positive wealth effects for firms with weak internal and external corporate governance, which suggests that 
bank monitoring may substitute for weak governance); Ioannis Spyridopoulos, Tough Love: The Effect of 
Deb  Con ac  De ign on Fi m  Pe fo mance, 9 REV. CORP. FIN. STUD. 44, 47 (2020) (finding that even 
absent any covenant violation, stricter loan covenants improve performance of firms with managerial agency 
conflicts those (a) without a large monitoring blockholder; (b) facing softer product market competition; or 
(c) with entrenched management). See also Sungyoon Ahn & Wooseok Choi, The Role of Bank Monitoring 
in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Borro e  Ea ning  Managemen  Beha io , 33 J. BANK. & FIN. 
425 (2009) (finding ha  bo o e  fi m  ea ning  managemen  beha io  dec ea e  a  he eng h of bank 
monitoring increases).  
3 Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Boardroom: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate 
Governance, 57 UCLA LAW. REV. 115, 125 (2009). 
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documented over the past few decades,4 and the finance literature continues 
to expand the mapping of lender governance.5 
Various observers of the lending markets, however, including 
regulators and rating agencies, foresee potential trouble ahead. Covenants are 
disappearing; lender interventions are becoming more rare.6 Without loan 
covenants, there is no lender governance or monitoring. The leveraged loan 
market triggers special concern. Leveraged loans are relatively risky, below-
investment-grade loans.7 Over the last decade, this market has exploded, 
more than doubling in size. From 2010 a low point for leveraged lending in 
the aftermath of the financial crisis to mid-2019, leveraged lending grew 
from about $550 billion to $1.2 trillion.8 In that same period, the share of so-
called covenant-li e ( co -li e ) le e aged loan  j mped f om nde  5% o 
about 85%.9 Cov-li e  loan  a e o i ome beca e he  con ain no financial 
maintenance covenants. Traditional loan agreements include covenants, 
which con ain a io  a pec  of he bo o e  ope a ion  o  in e men  
or financing decisions, in order to protect the lender from borrower risk 
taking over the life of the loan. A financial maintenance covenant requires 
the borrower to maintain a specified level of financial constraint, e.g., a 
certain ratio of debt to cash flow or earnings relative to interest expense.10 
 
4 Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 219  (1987) 
(showing a positive and statistically significant stock price response to the public announcement of bank 
loans, but a nonpositive response for publicly placed straight debt issues, and a negative and statistically 
significant response for debt privately placed with insurance companies and private placements and straight 
debt issues used to repay bank loans); George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive 
Corporate Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1100-01 (1995) (noting that the prospect of repeat business 
with the borrower firm may serve to align he bank  in e e  i h ho e of e i  holde  a  o in e men  
polic  and he fi m  eco e ); Sudip Datta, Mai Iskandar-Datta & Ajay Patel, Bank Monitoring and the 
Pricing of Corporate Public Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 435, 437 (1999) (finding that the presence of a preexisting 
bank loan reduces at-i e ield p ead  fo  bo o e  fi m  fi  p blic deb  offe ing  b  an a e age of 68 
basis points, and the length of the bank/firm relationship is negatively related to at-issue yield spreads, 
consistent with the monitoring hypothesis); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the 
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209 (2006). Firm value may also be enhanced 
h o gh he ce ifica ion effec  of bank lending. A bank  decision to extend financing may signal the 
bo o e  fi m  c edi o hine , offe ing ef l info ma ion o ec i ie  ma ke  and he eb  enhancing 
he ma ke  al e of he fi m  e i . 
5 E.g., Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm 
Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713 (2012) (finding that firm operating performance and stock price performance 
improve post-covenant-violation); Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira & Beatriz Mariano, Creditor Control 
Rights and Board Independence, 73 J. FIN. 2385 (2018) (finding that the number of independent directors 
increases by about 24% following a covenant violation, that most new directors have ties to lenders, and that 
firms that appoint new directors post-violation are more likely to issue new equity and to decrease payouts, 
operational risk, and CEO cash compensation). 
6 See infra Part II.D. 
7 Though there is no formal agreed-upon definition of what counts as a leveraged loan, a syndicated loan 
rated BB+ or lower, or an unrated loan with an interest spread larger than 150 basis points (bps), is one 
common benchmark. Loan Pricing Corporation, PC definition. A BB+ rating is the highest grade of non-
investment-g ade (o  pec la i e  g ade) loan. Speculative grade loans are more likely to default than 
investment-grade loans. As of mid-2017, some 90% of loans issued in the U.S. are rated. S&P GLOBAL, 
LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA (LCD): LEVERAGED LOAN PRIMER 8 (2020); available at 
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LCD%20Loan%20Primer.pdf. A basis point (bp) is 1/100 of a percentage 
point. So 150 bps is 1.5%. 
8 Michelle Sierra, Leveraged Loan Market Size Doubles in Ten Year, Private Credit Explodes, REUTERS 
(Dec. 23, 2019); Joe Rennison & Colby Smith, Debt Machine: Are Risks Piling Up in Leveraged Loans?, 
FIN. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2019). 
9 See infra note 140 and accompanying text. 
10 The ratio of earnings to interest expense is commonly referred to as the Interest Coverage Ratio.  
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With no financial maintenance covenants, a cov-lite loan is riskier than 
traditional loans.11 Co -lite takes away the canary in the coal mine for 
lenders. 12 Borrower firms seem happy to take up these risky loans, since the 
ca ci  of co enan  mean  fe e  con ain  on fi m  ope a ion  and i k 
taking. At the same time, lender-investors appreciate the high interest rates 
and fees that come with risky loans. Moreover, as the costs of credit continue 
to decline as leveraged loan credit supply expands, lenders may enjoy less 
and less clout to demand covenant protection. The explosion of leveraged and 
cov-lite loans over the last decade naturally leaves regulators with misgivings 
about the quantum of risk taking in loan markets.13 
In addition to the prospect of riskier loan markets, fewer and weaker 
covenants and an observed decline in lender interventions may portend 
weakened corporate governance. Financial economists have demonstrated 
empirically that judiciously crafted covenants can improve firm value.14 
Through covenants and monitoring, lenders routinely exercise significant 
influence over corporate decision making. Weaker covenant protections and 
fewer lender interventions may therefore detract from effective corporate 
governance.15 Covenants screen borrowers ex ante. They also act as tripwires 
e  po  o ca ch he a en ion of bo h he lende  and he bo o e  
management. A covenant violation triggers a re-e al a ion of he lende  
constraints on management, and perhaps a renegotiation of loan terms, often 
well before a borrower firm approaches distress.  
In this Article, I offer an updated and somewhat optimistic 
perspective on the leveraged loan market and lender governance. Despite 
important changes in lending markets that could plausibly exacerbate 
systemic risk and blunt the efficacy of lender governance, I show that lending 
practices have evolved to address the new risky lending. The steep growth of 
the leverage loan market may suggest that lenders have only weak leverage 
to demand contractual protections. But it turns out that lender governance 
persists, even as syndicated lending has become more complex.  
 One a ifac  of oda  le e aged lending i  the greater number and 
more diverse types of lenders involved in a leveraged loan deal as compared 
to traditional syndicated loans. Traditional syndications typically involved 
only banks, which typically held their loans to maturity. Today, banks still 
arrange syndicated loans, but they are as likely to sell the loans in secondary 
loan markets to non-bank institutional investors. Larger and more disparate 
lender groups make loan enego ia ion  ( workouts ) more difficult. 
Different types of institutions hold differing priorities. A non-bank lending 
 
11 Cov-lite loans may, however, include so-called inc ence  co enants, which require compliance with 
caps or financial ratios only when the borrower pursues a specified significant action, like issuing new debt 
or paying dividends or making an acquisition. See infra notes 138-140 and accompanying text. 
12 Rennison & Smith, supra note 8 (quoting Ruth Yang, managing director at S&P Global Market 
Intelligence). 
13 See infra Part II.D. 
14 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
15 Jeremy McClane, Corporate Non-Governance, 44 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2020). 
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group may include collateralized loan obligations (CLOs),16 loan mutual 
funds, insurance companies, foreign investors, and pension funds, among 
others. The presence of heterogeneous lending institutions complicates the 
renegotiation of a loan agreement. 
Another practice worrisome to regulators in ol e  bo o e  
potentially excessive leverage. Especially in the context of acquisitions and 
other extraordinary transactions, borrowers and lenders have taken to the 
p ac ice of ea ning  add-back .  The parties craft bespoke accounting 
provisions in their private loan contracts that allow for adjustments to 
projected earnings, which affect earnings-based financial covenants. With the 
j ifiable aim of p e en ing a fai  pic e of he bo o e  f e ea ning , 
the post-transaction borrower will adjust (augment) its earnings by adding 
back non-recurring items that affect cash flows or accruals for example, 
one-time charges or expenses of the transaction. The fi m  deb -to-earnings 
ratio is a typical leverage measure. Upward adjustments to earnings reduce 
he fi m  epo ed le e age, hich ma  c ea e an e ce i el  o  pic e. 
To the extent the borrower overstates adjusted earnings through add-backs, 
the leverage measure may become even less reliable. 
Lenders have adapted to these concerns, however. Lenders have 
evolved new covenant structures to address the new and more complicated 
renegotiation frictions that arise with leveraged loans. Covenants have 
become more useful in three ways. First, loan arrangers have created so-
called split control rights. An examination of individual cov-lite leveraged 
loans might suggest an absence of covenant constraints, but it turns out that 
very few leveraged loan deals are issued without maintenance covenants. 
Taking account of all the loan tranches in a given deal, the banks continue to 
enjoy the benefit of maintenance covenant constraints on the borrower firm. 
The typical leveraged loan deal includes a bank-sponsored loan, which 
almost always contains traditional financial covenants.17 At the same time, 
the bank group will arrange one or more additional loans for the borrower, 
but these loans will be sold to non-bank institutional lenders.18 In many deals, 
the bank-held loans and institutional loans will include identical covenants. 
But only the banks, and not the institutional lenders, enjoy the right to 
renegotiate covenants or waive violations. This split control effectively 
leaves the banks in charge of renegotiations with the borrower, reducing 
bargaining frictions. Traditional co enan  in he bank  loan con ain he 
borrower firm, which is subject to the covenants in all its loans. The absence 
of maintenance covenants in a particular loan, then, does not mean that the 
borrower is free from covenant constraints.19   
 
16 A CLO is a securitization vehicle that buys slices of many syndicated loans, issuing securities to investors 
that are backed by the cash flows from the loans purchased. William W. Bratton & Adam J. Levitin, A Tale 
of Two Markets: Regulation and Innovation in Post-Crisis Mortgage and Structured Finance Markets, 2020 
U. ILL. L. REV. 47, 97-105 (explaining CLO structure and post-financial-crisis evolution of CLO indentures 
and federal regulation). See also infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text. 
17 This bank loan will typically be a revolving loan. The bank group may also extend an amortizing term 
loan. See infra note 127 and accompanying text. 
18 These loans sold to institutional lenders are typically non-amortizing term loans, which for reasons we 
discuss below, are riskier than the loans retained by banks. See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra Part III.A. 
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Second, with respect to add-backs, though upward earnings 
adjustments carry some risk of understating borrower leverage, new research 
suggests that permissive use of add-backs may improve the informativeness 
of EBITDA-based contract terms like financial covenants.20 Tailored 
accounting provisions for financial performance covenants in private loan 
agreements predict future cash flows better than GAAP-based measures.21 
Better earnings information may eliminate noisy features of accounting 
earnings, such that add-backs may facilitate both tighter covenants and fewer 
false positive covenant violations.22  
Lenders have recrafted covenants in another way as well. Over the 
course of the last two decades, covenants have become more efficient. This 
efficiency is driven largely by a turn away from balance sheet covenants in 
favor of cash flow covenants, which are much more discerning than balance 
sheet covenants. Cash flow covenants trigger false positives far less often 
than balance sheet covenants, with a negligible increase in false negatives.23 
Financial covenants overall have also become less restrictive, both in terms 
of the number of covenants in a given loan and their tightness. Reported 
violations are correspondingly fewer. This should not be read as cause for 
concern, however. Rather than leaving borrower firms with no guardrails, 
covenant structures have instead become better at discriminating distress 
from non-distress situations.24 Efficient covenants minimize the sum of 
expected costs of false positives and false negatives. 
The advent of split control rights, the informativeness of add-backs for 
predicting future cash flows to set financial covenants, and the evolution to 
efficient covenants suggest that it may be time to rework our understandings 
of the magnitude and direction of lender governance. Fewer and more lax 
covenants may not necessarily portend greater risk in the leveraged lending 
market. Lower levels of lender intervention do not necessarily herald weaker 
lender oversight. 
My analysis proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the traditional 
structure of bank lending and the role of covenants and monitoring for lender 
governance. I de c ibe bank  traditional and particular expertise in crafting 
covenants, monitoring borrowers, and renegotiating loan terms when the 
borrower falters. Traditional covenant structure meant tight covenants and 
pervasive monitoring, which differs dramatically from the evolved lender 
governance of split control rights and more efficient covenants. In Part II, I 
describe the evolution from traditional lending to a new and riskier loan 
market, driven in part by banking deregulation, in part by the advent of junk 
bonds and the 1980s leveraged buyout boom, in part by modernized bank 
capital rules, and in part by the advent of securitization. I also summarize the 
 
20 See infra Part III.B. EBITDA is one common earnings measure. It stands for Earnings Before Interest, 
Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization.  
21 See id. GAAP stands for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  
22 For our purposes, a false positive occurs when a borrower violates a covenant even though only a low 
likelihood of distress exists See id. 
23 A false negative occurs when the borrower has a high likelihood of distress, but no covenant is triggered. 
See infra Part III.C. 
24 See id. 
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misgivings of regulators and other debt market observers concerned with the 
ne  loan ma ke  appe i e fo  i k. In Part III, I explain the new lender 
governance regime. It features a number of lending contract innovations
split control rights, add-back informativeness, and efficient covenants.25 
These innovations facilitate lender governance and debt renegotiation in the 
face of larger loan syndicates with more dispersed lenders than in the past. I 
also discuss implications of the new lender governance. Part IV concludes. 
 
I. TRADITIONAL BANK LENDING: COVENANTS AND MONITORING  
This Part describes the structural features of bank lending that facilitate 
traditional bank monitoring. It introduces the tools banks use to constrain 
borrower risk taking and to facilitate monitoring primarily an array of 
covenants that include affirmative and negative constraints and reporting and 
financial covenants. It then explains traditional covenant structure, both the 
e ing of co enan  and he bank  managemen  of co enan  iola ion . 
 
A. The Structure of Bank Lending 
Unlike equity holders, lenders do not enjoy unlimited upside with their 
debt investments in firms. Instead, lenders must content themselves with the 
regular periodic interest payments that their loan contracts memorialize, and 
also the repayment of principal when the loan matures. Because lenders enjoy 
no great upside from their lending, their natural obsession is to curb as much 
downside risk as possible, without drastically in e fe ing i h he bo o e  
ability to earn a respectable profit. By contrast, public company equity 
holde , ho a e picall  di e ified, a e be e  off hen hei  fi m  
managers pursue all available positive net present value projects. Because 
high returns to the firm arise only from firm managers taking high risks, 
equity holders sometimes push for risky gambits. 
This divergence of interests between lenders and equity holders gets 
worked out in loan agreements. Lenders use covenants to constrain borrower 
risk taking, and borrowers and lenders will trade off interest rate against 
covenant strictness to reach a deal. A safer deal for the lender means a lower 
interest rate for the borrower. Typical affirmative covenants include 
obligations to purchase insurance and to comply with all applicable laws and 
regulations. Typical negative covenants include constraints on additional 
firm borrowing, payment of dividends or distributions to equity holders, and 
major asset sales. Financial covenants are also typical. For example, the 
lender may set a cap on the ratio of the bor o e  deb -to-cash flow, in an 
effort to assure that the borrower will be able to maintain its periodic interest 
payments.26 
 
25 See infra Parts III.A and III.C, respectively. 
26 In addition to debt-to-cash flow, other common financial covenants include a fixed charge coverage ratio 
(a mea e of he bo o e  abili  o co e  all i  fi ed cha ge ); a current ratio (the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities); and a net worth covenant. 
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Bank  enjo  acce  o p i a e info ma ion abo  hei  bo o e  
business activities. Bank loan agreements typically demand regular reporting 
by the borrower, including financial statements and certificates attesting to 
he bo o e  continuing compliance with financial covenants and other 
contractual obligations. Bank lenders also often require their borrower firms 
to keep their deposit accounts with the lending bank. This arrangement 
enable  he lende  o clo el  follo  i  bo o e  agg ega ion and e  of 
ca h in eal ime, gi ing he lende  a clea  indo  on he bo o e  b ine  
activity.27 These institutional features of bank lending make banks especially 
effective monitors. Moreover, there is evidence that bank monitoring benefits 
not only the bank and other creditors; it may also improve firm value to the 
benefit of equity holders. Event studies consistently associate the public 
announcement of bank loans with positive abnormal stock returns for the 
borrower firm.28 The announcement is typically good news for shareholders, 
since the loan commits the bank to monitoring the borrower firm over the life 
of the loan.29 
 
 
27 Fisher Black, Bank Funds Management in an Efficient Market, 2 J. FIN. ECON. 323, 326 (1975) (explaining 
the informational advantages for a lender from maintaining i  bo o e  depo i  acco n ); A no d W. A. 
Boot, Relationship Banking: What Do We Know, 9 J. FIN. INTERMED. 7, 11 (2000); Eugene F. Fama, What s 
Different About Banks?, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 29, 37-38 (1985). Bank lenders also typically enjoy wide 
acce  o hei  bo o e  book  and eco d . A bank ma  al o ha e a ep e en a i e on i  bo o e  boa d 
of directors, which enables the bank to obtain soft information about the borrower. Tung, supra note 3, at 
138-40. 
28 See Christopher James, Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 217, 219 (1987); 
Myron B. Slovin, Shane A. Johnson, & John L. Glascock, Firm Size and the Information Content of Bank 
Loan Announcements, 16 J. BANKING & FIN. 1057, 1058 (1992); Ronald Best & Hang Zhang, Alternative 
Information Sources and the Information Content of Bank Loans, 48 J. Fin. 1507, 1511 (1993); Matthew T. 
Billett, Mark J. Flannery, & Jon A. Garfinkel, The Effec  of Lende  Iden i  on a Bo o ing Fi m  E i  
Return, 50 J. FIN. 699, 700 (1995). A related literature suggests that nonbank private debt may also bring 
bank-like benefits to equity holders. These studies show a positive stock price reaction to announcements of 
nonbank private debt placements, with no statistical difference between announcements of bank debt versus 
nonbank private debt. See Dianna C. Preece & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring by Financial 
Intermediaries: Banks Versus Nonbanks, 8 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 193, 199 (1994); Billet, et al., supra. 
29 See Sudha Krishnaswami, Paul A. Spindt & Venkat Subramaniam, Information Asymmetry, Monitoring, 
and the Placement Structure of Corporate Debt, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 407, 409 (1999) (finding that firms with 
greater growth prospects and therefore greater debt-related moral hazard problems rely more heavily on 
private debt than public debt, and attributing this result to the monitoring advantages of private debt); Scott 
L. Lummer & John J. McConnell, Further Evidence on the Bank Lending Process and the Capital-Market 
Response to Bank Loan Agreements, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 101 (1989) (finding excess stock returns almost 
exclusively around the announcement of loan renewals, but not new loans, and concluding that the value to 
shareholders comes not from the initial screening of prospective borrowers, but from private information the 
bank gleans during the course of its relationship with the borrower, consistent with a monitoring theory). 
Thi  po i i e ock ma ke  eac ion ma  al o a i e f om a complemen a  o ce. The bank  deci ion to 
extend credit may signal that it has positive private information about the firm i.e., the bank resolves 
adverse selection problems for the stock market. See Best & Zhang, supra note 28; Charles J. Hadlock & 
Christopher M. James, Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?, 57 J. FIN. 1383 (2002); Wayne H. Mikkelson & 
M. Megan Partch, Valuation Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31 
(1986); Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms 
Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1984). The crossmonitoring benefits 
may run in favor of the bank as well. One study finds that bank debt is cheaper for firms with publicly traded 
shares or investment-grade public debt outstanding. James R. Booth, Contract Costs, Bank Loans, and the 
Cross-Monitoring Hypothesis, 31 J. FIN. ECON. 25 (1992). 
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B. Traditional Covenant Structure 
Covenant constraints in the initial loan agreement both screen 
borrowers ex ante and c b manage  di c e ion f om he incep ion of he 
lending relationship. Subsequent covenant violations trigger lender scrutiny 
and the possibility of further constraints on management and operations.  
1. Covenant Setting to Control Agency Costs 
Empirical studies show that the structuring of initial covenants 
responds to firm characteristics that affect credit risk, and that managers alter 
their behavior in response to covenant constraints. Lender influence 
commences from the very beginning of the lending arrangement. 
Among other fears, lenders would worry that once credit is extended, 
firm managers may favor their own interests or the interests of equity holders 
over those of creditors. Managers might, for instance, substitute risky projects 
for more conservative ones, since in the presence of debt, diversified equity 
holders do better with the former than the latter. Managers might even spend 
free cash on negative net present value projects, either to build empires for 
hei  o n benefi  o  o imp o e e i  holde  p ide e n . The finance 
literature has identified situations in which these agency costs may be most 
troublesome. Financial distress, for example, heightens the conflict between 
debt and equity. 
Traditional covenant structure responds to those perils. Firms with 
greater risk of financial distress smaller, more highly levered, more volatile 
firms, and firms with highly liquid assets are more likely to have covenants 
in their lending agreements. By contrast, loans to firms with a higher ratio of 
tangible assets to total assets are less likely to include covenants.30 This 
makes sense as tangible assets are easier to value and easier to liquidate than 
in angible a e  in he e en  of he fi m  defa l . Fi m  i h in angible 
assets and growth opportunities are riskier because realization of the value of 
these opportunities depends on discretionary future investment by the firm. 
Specific covenants address this sort of risk: high growth firms are more likely 
to attract demands for security, financial ratio covenants, and covenants 
restricting dividends.31 Moreover, historically, private lenders set covenants 
fairly tightly relative to the variability of the underlying accounting measure, 
adj ing co enan  lack  o acco n  fo  hi  a iabili  fo  each bo o e .32 
Tighter covenants were also associated with lower borrowing costs, 
consistent with the proposition that lenders valued these stricter limits and 
their effects on borrower behavior.33 
 
30 Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants, 5 Q.J. 
Fin. 1 (2015) (analyzing commercial loans made from 1993 2001, a  eflec ed in Loan P icing Co po a ion  
Dealscan database). 
31 Id. at 19, tbl. 6 (relying on the market-to-book ratio as a measure of growth).  
32 Ilia D. Dichev & Douglas J. Skinner, Large-Sample Evidence on the Debt Covenant Hypothesis, 40 J. 
ACCT. RES. 1091, 1093 & 1106 07 (2002). 
33 Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, The Information Content of Bank Loan Covenants, 23 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 3700 (2010). Tighter covenan  ma  al o impl  eflec  he lende  highe  confidence in he 
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Co enan  al o likel  affec  manage  beha io . De pi e he fac  ha  
technical covenant violations are common and do not typically result in 
punitive lender action, managers cannot count on this. A violation triggers 
he lende  legal igh  o demand immedia e epa men  of he en i e deb , 
and even though acceleration is unlikely, a violation might always cause 
ome c ailmen  of manage ial di c e ion h o gh he bank  in e en ion. 
Even for healthy firms in the best of situations, there is a hassle factor: a 
violation requires managers to explain. It triggers review by the bank and may 
impose additional reporting burdens on borrower management, which is put 
to the task of defending its forecasts and strategies.34 All this takes time away 
from running the company. Banks also often charge a fee for a waiver or 
modification of the loan. Managers have incentive to comply. 
Though measuring the effects of loan covenants on managerial 
behavior may be a bit tricky, studies tend to confirm that covenants have real 
effec . When e look a  fi m pe fo mance follo ing he loan  incep ion, 
we find some telling patterns. Comparing quarter-end accounting measures 
with the associated covenants, one study finds an unusually small number of 
loan quarters with borrower performance slightly beyond covenant 
thresholds that is, in violation while an unusually large number cluster 
just shy of the violation point.35 In other words, there is a significant 
discontinuity in the di ib ion of fi m  pe fo mance on acco n ing 
measures constrained by covenants. Moreover, the discontinuous pattern 
becomes more pronounced over the life of the loan. This longitudinal 
dimension is important. Clustering in general, while consistent with the view 
that covenants constrain managers, does not necessarily rule out the 
anticipatory contracting explanation that covenants are set in order to 
an icipa e he bo o e  f e pe fo mance, b  no  o con ain i . When 
lenders set tight covenants, we would expect to see some clustering near the 
covenant threshold. Anticipatory contracting could plausibly account for 
clustering generally or discontinuity in the quarters immediately following 
he loan  incep ion. Ho e e , he pe i ence and inc eased prominence of 
hi  di con in o  pa e n in a loan  la e  ea  i  diffic l  o e plain a  an 
artifact of anticipatory contracting.36 Instead, the pattern suggests that 
covenants have real bite: firms attempt to manage in response to covenant 
constraints. 
2. Covenant Violations 
Not surprisingly, poor performance and covenant violations typically 
cause lenders to monitor their borrowers more closely and perhaps to actively 
intervene in managerial decisionmaking. Financial covenant violations are 
 
bo o e  f e pe fo mance. See id. Stock price reactions to public announcement of loans are also larger 
for loans with tighter covenants. Id.  
34 Dichev & Skinner, supra note 32, at 1096 (describing the hassle factor). 
35 Id. at 1111 12 (investigating current ratio and net worth covenants). 
36 Id. 
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common, and they do not typically presage financial distress,37 though they 
might trigger some lender response. Over a ten-year period, according to one 
study, a quarter to almost a third of all public companies violated a financial 
covenant,38 and this may be a lower bound, as methodological constraints 
suggest that many technical violations may go undetected.39 Violations rarely 
lead to payment default or acceleration of the loan. A violation will trigger 
he lende  c in , and fi m manage  might be a ked o j if  he fi m  
strategies and forecasts. Ultimately, however, the lender most often waives 
the violation.40 
The second most likely lender response is to impose additional 
constraints on the borrower.41 More serious measures such as a reduction in 
credit, an increase in interest rate, or a requirement of additional collateral are 
less likely,42 ho gh of co e, if he fi m  slide were to continue, the bank 
would resort to these and other more aggressive measures.43 
Covenants are used primarily, then, not as a device to force the 
bo o e  immedia e epa men  of he loan, e en ho gh he lending 
agreement provides for that remedy. Instead, covenants serve as trip wires 
that signal the need for creditor attention. When the wire is tripped, the lender 
steps in to update its information about the borrower. The lender 
communicates with management and examines he fi m  financial position 
and internal forecasts. In most cases, tripping the wire does not ultimately 
result in any punitive response by the creditor. But it does command the 
 
37 Id. at 1093; Sudheer Chava & Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment?: The Role of 
Debt Covenants 2 (draft Aug. 2007); available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=854324. 
38 Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. 
FIN. 1657, 1663-1664 & tbl. I (2009) (finding that for population of U.S. public companies between 1996 
and 2005, more than one quarter violated a financial covenant, and for companies with an average leverage 
ratio of at least 5 percent, the percentage increases to 30%). See also Dichev & Skinner, supra note 32, at 
1093 (finding that with a Dealscan sample of private loans from 1986 99, violations occur in about 30 
percent of all loans); Chava and Roberts, supra note 37, at 11 (finding that 37 percent of firms subject to a 
current ratio covenant and 25 percent of firms subject to a net worth covenant during the period 1994 2005 
committed a violation of the respective covenant). 
39 One lending officer at a prominent insurance company reports that in a given year, the company will receive 
on average one request for a covenant modification for each loan on its books. Edward D. Zinbarg, The 
Private Placement Loan Agreement, FIN. ANALYSTS J., July-Aug. 1975, at 35 (discussing private placement 
lenders). 
40 V. Gopalakrishnan & Mohinder Parkash, Borrower and Lender Perceptions of Accounting Information in 
Corporate Lending Agreements, 9 ACCT. HORIZONS 13, 20 (1995) (surveying chief financial officers of 
Fortune 500 companies, chief lending officers of the largest 100 banks, and the heads of private placement 
departments at the top 100 insurance companies, with more than 95 percent of both borrowers and lenders 
indica ing a medi m o  high p obabili  of a ai e ). Acco ding o one lende  epo , mo e han 95 pe cen  
of e e  fo  co enan  modifica ion a e g an ed i h no id p o o: he a  majority of corporate 
e e  a e pe fec l  ea onable and do no  inc ea e [lende ] i k ma e iall .  Zinba g, supra note 39. 
41 Seventy-five percent of borrowers and 59 percent of lenders indicate a medium to high probability of 
additional constraints. Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, supra note 40, at 20, 21 tbl.3. 
42 Id.; Roberts & Sufi, supra note 38, at 1688, 1689 tbl. IX (noting from SEC filings for a random sample of 
500 initial covenant-violating firms that 24% of violations resulted in reduced credit availability; 15% 
resulted in increases in interest spread; 7% resulted in the lender requiring additional collateral; and that in 
the aggregate, 32% of lenders took at least one of these actions, while 63% of violations resulted in a waiver 
without additional action). 
43 The most drastic remedies of termination of the agreement and acceleration of the debt are, of course, the 
least common. Over 76 percent of Fortune 500 borrowers and more than 90 percent of their lenders assign a 
zero or low probability to these outcomes. Gopalakrishnan & Parkash, supra note 40, at 20 21 tbl.3. 
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lende  a en ion and gives the lender the option to act, depending on what 
its investigation shows. 
 
3. Lender Governance 
Besides simply shoring p a bo o e  c edi o hine  i h e a 
collateral or reduced credit availability once a non-trivial violation occurs, a 
lender may additionally force important changes in the way the firm operates. 
The lender may demand crucial changes to financial policy or investment 
policy. In a drastic situation, the lender may force the CEO  replacement.   
The lende  infl ence on financial polic , of co e, begin  a  he 
loan  incep ion. Almost all loan agreement  limi  he bo o e  abili  o 
incur additional debt.44 The restriction typically places a cap on a debt-related 
ratio, using a debt measure as numerator and a measure of earnings, cash 
flow, or capitalization as the denominator.45 A covenant violation often 
invites further constraints by the lender. In one study, normalizing firm 
borrowing as a percentage of assets, a covenant violation results in a 0.7% 
decrease in average firm borrowing in the quarter immediately following the 
violation. This is an economically significant drop.46 It also endures. 
Like financial policy, investment policy is a crucial aspect of manager  
strategic decision making, effectively placing he fi m  be  on he f e. 
Banks typically enjoy meaningful influence over these decisions, since 
covenant constraints allocate control rights over investment policy, making it 
con ingen  on he fi m  pe fo mance. For example, one-third of public 
company loan agreements contain a capital expenditure covenant, and over a 
ten-year sample period, 42% of public firms face a capital expenditure 
restriction at some point.47 Firms facing a new capital expenditure restriction 
experience a decline in investment 15-20% larger than firms not facing a new 
restriction.48 Not surprisingly, such restrictions are quite sensitive to firm 
performance. A covenant violation, an increase in credit risk (as measured by 
he bo o e  deb -to-cash-flow ratio), or a ratings downgrade increases the 
 
44 Roberts & Sufi, supra note 38, at 1663 (noting that almost 90% of loan agreements in their sample contain 
an e plici  o  implici  e ic ion on he bo o e  o al deb ). 
45 Over 79 percent of loan agreements in the sample contain such a covenant. Id. at tbl. I. For example, one 
agreement defines a leverage ratio: 
Le e age Ra io  mean, on any date, the ratio of (a) Total Indebtedness as of such date to 
(b) Consolidated EBITDA for the period of four consecutive quarters of the Company ended on such 
date. 
Further down, the agreement caps the ratio at 3:1. 
SECTION 6.12. Leverage Ratio. The Company will not permit the Leverage Ratio as of the last day of 
any fiscal quarter to exceed 3.00 to 1.00.  
Credit Agreement Dated as of November 14, 2006, Among Amerisourcebergen Corporation et al., §§ 6.11, 
6.12 (on file i h a ho ). EBITDA  i  ea ning  befo e in e e , a e , dep ecia ion, and amo i a ion.  
46 Compare the effect of a change in firm size, which is the single most powerful predictor of net borrowing. 
A two-standard-deviation reduction in the size of the firm results in only a 0.52% reduction in net borrowing 
per quarter. In relative terms, the 0.7% drop moves the firm from the 65th to the 35th percentile of the within-
firm net debt issuance distribution. Id. at 1659. 
47 Greg Nini, David C. Smith & Amir Sufi, Creditor Control Rights and Firm Investment Policy, 92 J. FIN. 
ECON. 400, 405 (2009). 
48 Id. at 413. 
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likelihood that the borrower will face an investment restriction. For example, 
a firm that suffers a ratings downgrade from he lo e  S anda d & Poo  
investment grade (BBB) to the highest speculative grade (BB) experiences a 
21% increase in the likelihood of incurring a capital expenditure restriction.49 
A similar increase in the likelihood of facing a capital expenditure restriction 
befalls the borrower violating a covenant.50 While violating firms also 
commonly face interest rate increases, demands for collateral, and dividend 
restrictions, the elasticity of the capital expenditure restriction with respect to 
a violation is significantly larger than the elasticity of other loan terms.51  
Finally, it is important to highlight the uncommon but sometimes 
nece a  ep of eplacing a bo o e  fi m  CEO. Tho gh canonical 
accounts of change in the C-suite typically view boards of directors as the 
central players, as a practical matter, lender influence may be at least as 
important in many cases. The pattern is familiar. Having chosen a CEO who 
subsequently oversaw excellent results over a number of years, a board may 
be lo  o ecogni e hen he CEO  magic ha  n o . Ha ing invested in 
the effort to handpick a CEO, and then cheered her success for a time, 
directors may naturally be reluctant later to second-guess their decision or 
consider the possibility of a replacemen . Once i  ha  in alled o  cho en o 
e ain a CEO, he boa d i  mo i a ed o  he CEO mo e han i  ho ld. 52 
Lenders, of course, are less likely to suffer from this commitment bias.53 They 
were not formally (and likely not even informally) a part of the process that 
chose this CEO. So he lende  ma  be able o a e  he bo o e  i a ion 
with more dispassion than the directors who backed the now-faltering CEO. 
When the borrower gets into trouble, and shareholder pressure and the market 
for corporate control are insufficient to effect a CEO change, lender influence 
ma  be ke . The fi m  do n a d pi al ill likel  igge  covenant 
violations, which shifts control to lenders. And though lenders of course do 
no  fo mall  decide he e i ing CEO  fa e no  ap he  cce o , lende  
influence is felt. As earlier noted,54 once lenders enjoy the right to accelerate 
the entire debt, a number of less drastic measures are also on the table. CEO 
replacement is one.55 
The familiar story of Krispy Kreme offers an illustration. Scott 
Livengood served as K i p  K eme  CEO from 1998-2005. He had worked 
for the company for several decades, having come up through the ranks of 
the HR department. His devotion to and enthusiasm for the company were 
legend. His wedding cake, for example, was made entirely from Krispy 
 
49 Id. at 401. 
50 Id. (noting that a capital expenditure restriction is 20% more likely with a covenant violation).  
51 Id. at 411 & tbl. 6. 
52 Donald C. Langevoort, Resetting the Corporate Thermostat: Lessons from the Recent Financial Scandals 
About Self-Deception, Deceiving Others and the Design of Internal Controls, 93 GEO. L.J. 285, 294 (2004).  
53 See, e.g., Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a Chosen 
Course of Action, 16 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. PERFORMANCE 22, 22-44 (1976). 
54 Supra, Part I.2. 
55 Lenders generally need to be gingerly about expressing their druthers too forcefully in this context. 
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Kreme donuts.56 He took the company through its IPO in 2000. The ensuing 
three years saw he compan  ock p ice ad ple, and headcount 
increased by 7,000.57 Then the second largest doughnut chain in the country, 
K i p  K eme became a high-profile, closely watched darling in retail and 
investor circles after opening dozens of freestanding stores around the 
co n .  The compan  had a ained a c l -like follo ing. 58  
The da ling  a  a  somewhat short-lived, however. By 2004, 
K i p  K eme  pop la i  had aned. Li engood ini iall  blamed he lo -
ca b c a e fo  he compan  declining ale , b  others believed the decline 
was the result of improvident expansion the opening of too many stores too 
quickly without adequate support and planning.59 Its accounting practices 
also triggered an SEC investigation,60 which left the company vulnerable to 
a default declaration by its lenders for failing to file financial reports as 
required under he compan  $150 million loan agreement. The company 
had borrowed $91 million under the facility as of October 2004. By January 
2005, the lenders had cut off further borrowing, leaving the company and 
lenders to negotiate serial extensions of the default date while the company 
searched for alternative financing.61 By this point, needless to say, the lenders 
were well positioned to dictate terms. The compan   anno nced Li engood  
retirement as CEO, board chair, and director in a January press release.62  
 
* * * 
Having explained the mechanics of traditional lender governance, the 
next Part explains the evolution of loan markets over the past few decades, a 
period that has witnessed tremendous changes in debt markets, lending 
 
56 Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks, Once-Hot Krispy Kreme Ousts Its CEO Amid Accounting Woes, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 19, 2005); available at: 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110605594997928805#:~:text=The%20man%20who%20transformed%20
Krispy,woes%20and%20a%20federal%20probe [https://perma.cc/X8QU-RSF7]. 
57 Andy Serwer, The Hole Story: How Krispy Kreme Became the Hottest Brand in America, FORTUNE (July 
7, 2003); available at https://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/ 
2003/07/07/345535/index.htm [https://perma.cc/Z642-FGAM]. 
58 Lynne Miller, Krispy Kreme Replaces Top Bosses, SUPERMARKET NEWS (Jan. 24, 2005); available at 
https://www.supermarketnews.com/archive/krispy-kreme-replaces-top-bosses#comment-0. 
59 Id. 
60 Floyd Norris, Krispy Kreme Picks Turnaround Specialist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2005); available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/19/business/krispy-kreme-picks-turnaround-specialist.html. At the same 
time, Krispy Kreme announced that it would delay indefinitely the filing of its fiscal 2004 financial 
statements, which would have to be restated, with the expectation that net income would be cut by as much 
as 26% for the fiscal fourth quarter after correction of accounting errors. Mark Maremont & Rick Brooks, 
Fresh Woes Batter Krispy Kreme; Doughnut Firm to Restate Results, Delay SEC Filing; Shares Take a 15% 
Tumble, Wall St. J. (Jan. 5, 2005); available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB110484914816116399. 
61 By March 25, 2005, Krispy Kreme had not found an alternative lender, though it did succeed in pushing 
its default date back to April 11, 2005. Associated Press, Krispy Kreme Gets Extension, N.Y. TIMES (Mar 
26, 2005); available at https://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/26/business/krispy-kreme-gets-extension.html. 
62 Press Release, Krispy Kreme Doughnuts, Inc., Krispy Kreme Announces Management Changes (Jan. 18, 
2005); available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=120929&p-irol-newsArticle&ID=663642. 
The p e  elea e al o no ed he compan  ecen  eep ale  decline : Fo  he eigh  eek  ended Decembe  
26, 2004, systemwide and average weekly sales per factory store decreased by approximately 18% and 25%, 
e pec i el , f om he p io  ea  co e ponding eek . Id. 
The press release also announced the appointment of a consulting and crisis management group to run the 
company, that the company was barred from further borrowing under its $150 million credit facility, and that 
its lenders had agreed to defer the calling of a default pending further discussion. Id. 
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practices, and the uses of debt, as well as the emergence of new debt 
instruments. 
 
II. THE NEW LOAN MARKETS  
New loan markets have emerged in the face of major changes to the 
lending environment. I begin by describing traditional syndicated bank 
lending. I then explain important changes in banking regulation and bank 
lending markets that led to the skyrocketing supply and demand for leveraged 
loans. Financial services deregulation that began in the late 1970s led to 
increased competition to make loans. At the same time, with the leveraged 
buyout boom of the 1980s, firms and investors became more comfortable 
with riskier capital structures, happy to rely on risky debt both bank loans 
and high-yield bonds to finance massive takeovers. Modernization of bank 
capital rules also ultimately helped pushed banks toward an originate-to-
distribute model of lending. Together these various influences propelled a 
market for the new risky loans. 
 
A. Traditional Syndicated Bank Lending 
The typical bank loan to a public company is syndicated. A large 
money center bank he lead  bank negotiates the loan with the borrower 
while it assembles the lending syndicate.63 The lead bank takes the laboring 
oar in performing due diligence on the borrower, and prospective syndicate 
membe  picall  el  on he lead bank  doc men a ion in pe fo ming hei  
credit analyses.64 Once the syndicate is assembled and the loan is in place, 
the lead bank which typically holds the largest stake in the loan65 is 
granted wide powers to act as agent for the syndicate, for which the lead bank 
is paid a fee.66 It takes the lead in administering the loan, monitoring the 
 
63 See Amir Sufi, Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence From Syndicated Loans, 
62 J. FIN. 629, 633 (2007); Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Private Information, Agency 
Problems and Determinants of Loan Syndications: Evidence From 1987 1999, at 4 (Apr. 25, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=310003. The arranging 
bank may underwrite the loan as well, in effect committing to extend the specified loan even before the 
formation of the syndicate is complete. 
64 See Barry Bobrow, Mercedes Tech, and Linda Redding, An Introduction to the Primary Market, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 155, 179 (Allison Taylor & Alicia Sansone eds., 2007); 
Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 63, at 5; Katerina Simons, Why Do Banks Syndicate Loans?, NEW 
ENGLAND ECON REV. 45, Jan. Feb. 1993, at 47, available at https://www.bostonfed.org/-
/media/Documents/neer/neer193c.pdf. 
65 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1244; Sufi, supra note 63, at 633. But see Kristian Blickle, 
Quirin Fleckenstein, Sebastian Hillenbrand & Anthony Saunders, The M h of he Lead A ange  Sha e, 
FED. RES. BANK NY, Staff Rpt. No. 922 (May 2020) (using Shared National Credit Program data). 
66 The credit agreement spells out these relations among syndicate members. See Richard Wight, Warren 
Cooke, & Richard Gray, Understanding the Credit Agreement, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS 
AND TRADING supra note 64, at 209, 354. As competition among banks intensified and league tables became 
a pop la  de ice fo  keeping co e  among bank  and anking hem, lead a ange  began ca ing o  ne  
distinguishing roles and accompanying titles to induce participation in their syndicates. New and largely 
ceremonial i le  incl de admini a i e agen ,  ndica ion agen ,  doc men a ion agen ,  and 
managing agen ,  hich ma  al o indica e ome ha ing of f nc ion  that had traditionally been performed 
by the sole lead bank. See Steve Miller, Players in the Market, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS 
AND TRADING supra note 64, at 47, 50. 
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borrower and communicating with firm management on behalf of the 
syndicate, and disseminating information within the syndicate.67 When a 
borrower violates a covenant or defaults, the lead bank plays a central role in 
investigating and recommending a course of action to the syndicate.68 
As the arranger for the loan and its primary monitor and administrator, 
the lead bank typically enjoys informational advantages over other syndicate 
members. One might therefore worry that the lead bank could behave 
opportunistically toward syndicate members for example by syndicating 
poor quality loans or shirking on its monitoring duties. As the agent for the 
syndicate, the lead bank reaps only a pro rata benefit from diligent 
monitoring sharing with the entire lender group while it enjoys all the 
benefits from shirking.69 Lead banks and other private lenders may also sell 
their loans in liquid secondary loan markets. This ready exit option may 
create moral hazard, encouraging lax credit analysis in the origination process 
or weaker monitoring after the loan is made.70 
Traditionally, lead banks had reputational stakes in their treatment of 
syndicate members. Far from behaving opportunistically, lead banks would 
in fact syndicate loans of higher ex ante quality in larger proportions,71 and 
would retain larger proportions of riskier loans.72 Lead banks would also 
syndicate a larger proportion of loans to borrowers whose creditworthiness 
could be expected to hold up over time, as measured by ex post credit 
ratings.73 Mo e gene all , lead bank  ep a ion  a  fai hf l agen  imp o ed 
 
 67 Sufi, supra note 63, at 632 33. 
 68 Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, Renegotiation of Financial Contracts: Evidence from Private 
Credit Agreements, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 159 (2009). 
 69 For example, the lead bank might decide to devote more resources to originating new loans an 
activity that generates fees for the lead bank rather than monitoring existing syndicated loans, as to which 
risk is shared. 
 70 See Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable 
Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 391 (1995) (discussing moral hazard in the secondary loan market). 
Gi en o igina ing lende  likel  info ma ional ad an age  o e  econda  ma ke  p cha e , i  migh  no  
be surprising if lower quality loans were more likely to trade than those of higher quality. Especially given 
he eme ging o igina e-to-di ib e  model of ndica ion in which the lead arranger anticipates selling 
large portions of a given loan to institutional investors in secondary markets shortly after origination
arrangers may be less concerned about careful credit analysis or subsequent monitoring than if they expected 
to hold the loans for longer periods. See Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection 
in the Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit (Oct. 24, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290312; Greg Nini, How Non-Banks Increased the Supply of 
Bank Loans: Evidence from Institutional Term Loans (Mar. 18, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
author), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108818 (documenting the boom in syndicating leverage loan 
tranches to nonbank institutional investors). 
 71 See Steven A. Dennis & Donald J. Mullineaux, Syndicated Loans, 9 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 404, 
424 (testing for ex ante quality); see also Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, Loan Syndicate 
Structure: Evidence from Ex Post Risk 3 4 (Jan. 14, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1083707 (finding that lead banks syndicate greater proportions of loans 
to ex post higher quality borrowers as measured by bond ratings). 
 72 See Simons, supra note 64, at 49 tbl.3 (showing that the proportion of a syndicated loan retained by 
he lead bank inc ea e  i h he e e i  of he bo o e  c edi  p oblem , a  b e en l  de e mined b  
bank e amine  loan ali  cla ifica ion ); S fi, supra note 63, at 633. For more opaque borrowers, that 
require greater due diligence and monitoring, the lead bank generally retains a larger share of the loan and 
forms a more concentrated syndicate, with lenders that are clo e  o he bo o e  bo h geog aphicall  and 
in terms of prior lending relationships. Id. 
 73 Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 71, at 24. 
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their ability to arrange syndications.74 These findings suggest that lead banks 
valued their reputations, which induced them to monitor conscientiously 
despite the risk diversification from syndication. 
The lead bank also typically did not sell its stake,75 preferring instead 
to preserve its relationships with both the borrower and its syndicate 
members, who not only depended on the lead bank for monitoring services,76 
b  ag eed o join he ndica e el ing a  lea  in pa  on he lead bank  
continuing involvement in the loan. Lead banks also often constrained resale 
by syndicate members, imposing requirements that might include lead bank 
and even borrower consent.77 Lead banks and borrowers could plausibly be 
concerned about syndicate size and composition, since all other things being 
equal, a larger syndicate makes collective decisionmaking more difficult.78 
Holdout problems also increase with syndicate size,79 which may be 
e peciall  o bling hen he bo o e  di e  e i e  a modifica ion of 
the loan.80 
Lenders in general also anticipated potential secondary market 
p cha e  conce n  abo  mo al ha a d i h e pec  o moni o ing, as well 
as adverse selection.81 Selling lenders would not always sell their entire stake 
in a loan, often retaining a portion to assure purchasers of both the quality of 
he loan and he elle  con in ing ake in moni o ing he bo o e . 
Consistent with this implicit assurance, loan sellers typically retained larger 
portions of riskier loans.82 Loans that were ultimately sold also contained 
more restrictive covenants than loans that were not sold.83 These tighter 
covenants, by putting borrowers on a tighter leash, helped address both 
 
 74 See Dennis & Mullineaux, supra note 71, a  407 (finding ha  lead bank  cce  in ndica ing 
larger percentages of their loans is positively associated with reputational measures). 
 75 Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 1244. 
 76 See Panyagometh & Roberts, supra note 71, a  3 (de c ibing he lead bank  ole a  he delega ed 
monitor for the syndicate); Sufi, supra note 63, a  632 (no ing he lead a ange  ole a  he ndica e  
primary monitor);. For their part, borrowers generally expect and prefer a durable relationship with their lead 
bank, which ha  peciali ed kno ledge of i  bo o e  b ine  and financial condi ion. If he lead bank 
exits by selling its loan, the borrower may be left with a different agent bank that it has never worked with 
and that may not be to its liking. 
 77 Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of 
Commercial Lending Syndicates, 33 FIN. MGMT. 107, 111 (2004). Forty-four percent of the transactions in 
their sample of syndicates loans from 1987 1995 included a requirement for lead bank consent for loan 
resale. Id. at 117. 
 78 Modification of a syndicated loan requires a vote among the members. For major changes in 
principal, interest, maturity, or collateral unanimity is typically required. For technical violations or 
covenant waivers, a simple majority or supermajority will typically suffice. See Sufi, supra note 63, at 633. 
 79 Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995). 
 80 See Lee & Mullineaux, supra note 77, at 111. The effect of loan sale restrictions may be ambiguous 
in terms of reducing holdout problems, however. Originating syndicates tend to be larger and loan 
concentrations lower for loans with resale constraints. These liquidity constraints make the loan less attractive 
to participants, who take smaller shares as a result. Id. at 120 21. 
 81 That is, potential purchasers may fear that sellers only want to dump their bad loans. 
 82 Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 70, at 408 & tbl.5; cf. Berndt & Gupta, supra note 70 (finding 
evidence of bank moral hazard insofar as firms whose loans are sold have worse risk adjusted stock returns 
over the three years following the loan sale compared to firms whose loans are not sold). 
 83 Steven Drucker & Manju Puri, On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships 2 
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Research Working Paper No. WP 2007-04,2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=920877. 
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presale moral hazard and adverse selection.84 Tighter covenants set quick 
triggers for intervention, so that even a lender expecting to sell its loan would 
be prompted to investigate earlier and more often than with loose covenants, 
if for no other reason than to approve a waiver of any violation. Tighter 
covenants also helped mitigate a loan p cha e  info ma ional di ad an age 
by offering the same quick trigger for intervention that the seller enjoyed.85 
Overall, the evidence suggests that while syndication and secondary 
loan trading might theoretically have dampened bank  moni o ing 
incentives, lead banks and selling banks anticipated and addressed this 
concern for the benefit of syndicate members and loan purchasers, 
respectively. Lead banks understood their reputational stakes in refraining 
from opportunism in a syndication. Both lead banks and selling banks took 
steps to bond themselves as monitors.86 
 
B. Demand for Leveraged Loans 
In this section, I describe the evolution from traditional lending to a 
new and riskier loan market, driven in part by banking deregulation, in part 
by the advent of junk bonds and the 1980s leveraged buyout boom, in part by 
modernized bank capital rules, and in part by the advent of securitization. I 
also discuss the misgivings of regulators and other debt market observers 
conce ned i h he ne  loan ma ke  appe i e fo  i k. 
1. Banking Deregulation and Financial Fi m  
Consolidation 
Banking deregulation had important effects on lenders and lending 
markets. Beginning in the late 1970s, bank loan markets changed 
dramatically, and new forms of bank lending emerged, as states deregulated 
intrastate branching and interstate banking.87 Before deregulation, 
 
 84 Moreover, tighter covenants help inc ea e bo o e  deb  capaci  b  making hei  loan  mo e 
saleable in secondary markets. Id. 
 85 More generally, bank monitoring continues to have value in the presence of bank debt trading. Amar 
Gande and Anthony Saunders find that bank loan announcements are associated with positive stock price 
eac ion , e en hen he bo o e  loan  al ead  ade on he econda  ma ke . See Amar Gande & 
Anthony Saunders, Are Banks Still Special When There Is a Secondary Market for Loans?, 67 J. FIN. 1649 
(2012). This result holds even for distressed firms, for which reduced incentives for bank monitoring would 
ex ante be expected to have the most adverse effects. Id. Additionally, the inception of trading in the 
bo o e  bank deb  al o elici  a po i i e ock p ice reaction, suggesting that bank monitoring and the 
secondary market offer complementary sources of information about borrower firms. Id. 
 86 Charles Whitehead has offered a reason to embrace loan markets as a facilitator of lender 
governance. More complete credit markets may improve governance through transparent pricing of credit 
i k. In he ame a  ha  ock p ice  info m e i  holde  abo  he fi m  condi ion and p o pec , li id 
c edi  ma ke  ma  offe  p ice ignal  o c edi o  abo  a fi m  c editworthiness, enabling those creditors 
to adjust their relations with the firm. Creditors might come to rely on these credit market price signals as a 
supplement to or substitute for traditional covenants and monitoring. Charles K. Whitehead, The Evolution 
of Debt: Covenants, the Credit Market, and Corporate Governance, 34 J. CORP L. 641, 660 (2009). 
87 Anthony J. Crawford et al., Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J. 
BUS. 231, 233 (1995) (noting that most states required reciprocity); see R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, 
Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 109 (1995) 
(describing state-level deregulation of interstate banking beginning in the early 1980s). 
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commercial banking was a relatively clubby, cozy business, with banks 
operating in fairly protected, geographically segmented markets.88 Not only 
was interstate banking prohibited,89 but most states limited the size and 
geographical scope of banks operating within their borders.90 These 
constraints effectively limited the territorial scope of competition, carving up 
banking markets within each state. At the start of banking deregulation, only 
twelve states allowed unrestricted branching.91 However, by 1990, thirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia had removed all intrastate branching 
restrictions.92 
Interstate banking received a boost at the federal level in 1982: an 
amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act93 sanctioned interstate 
acquisition of failed banks and thrifts regardless of state law.94  Many states 
responded to the Act by entering into reciprocal multistate agreements freely 
allowing bank acquisitions among participant states. By 1989, forty-four 
states and the District of Columbia allowed some interstate banking.95 
Continuing this trend, the Riegle Neal Act (RNA) formally unleashed 
interstate banking across all states in 1994.96  Then in 1999, the Gramm
Leach Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (GLB Act) formally 
repealed the Depression-era barriers among banking, insurance, and 
securities activities.97 This allowed for the formation of multiline financial 
 
88 See generally Crawford et al., supra note 87 (investigating bank CEO compensation from 1976 to 1988); 
Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in the Banking and Financial 
Sectors, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 495, 496 (2009) (testing effects of banking deregulation from 1992 to 2002). 
89 Interstate banking enables a bank holding company (BHC) to own and operate banks in more than one 
state. Under the Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, states enjoyed the power 
to block interstate banking barring a BHC from acquiring a bank outside its home state without the approval 
of he a ge  bank  a e. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (2006). 
90  Kevin J. Stiroh & Philip E. Strahan, Competitive Dynamics of Deregulation: Evidence from U.S. Banking, 
35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 801, 806 (2003). In ni  banking a e , b anching a  rictly 
prohibited. In effect, each bank was permitted only one place of business its unit bank within the state. 
Other states allowed only limited branching. Id. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. at 808 tbl.1. 
93  12 U.S.C. § 1842. 
94  Garn St. Germain Depository Institutions Act (Garn St. Germain Act) of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 
§ 116, 96 Stat. 1469, 1476 79 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1823); see also Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. 
Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching 
Restrictions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1437, 1442 (1999) (describing the impact of the Garn St. Germain Act). The 
range of permissible products that depository institutions could offer was broadened beginning in 1980. For 
example, DIDMCA preempted state usury laws capping mortgage interest rates, finance charges, and 
discount points. DIDMCA, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501, 94 Stat. 161, 161 63 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-
7a). The Garn St. Germain Act authorized depository institutions to offer money market deposit accounts. 
Garn St. Germain Act § 327 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3503) (directing the Deposit Institutions Deregulation 
Commi ee o p om lga e le  allo ing depo i o  in i ion  o offe  a ne  depo i  acco n  di ec l  
equivalent to and competitive i h mone  ma ke  m al find ). The Garn St. Germain Act also preempted 
state law restrictions on due-on-sale clauses. Garn St. Germain Act § 341 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-
3(b)(1)). 
95  Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 90, at 808 tbl.1. 
96  Riegle Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 
2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
97  Gramm Leach Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999). 
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services firms in the form of bank holding companies.98 These important 
deregulatory statutes pushed commercial banks further out of their cozy 
protected markets,99 forcing them not only to compete with one another 
across state lines,100 but also to compete with investment banks and other 
diversified financial firms with insurance, securities, and mutual fund 
businesses. Deregulation initially had salutary procompetitive effects. 
Increased competition led to greater growth opportunities in commercial 
banking.101 A  he ame ime, bank  traditional financial intermediation 
business model came under stress. Funding became more problematic, as 
consumers discovered money market funds and other alternatives to bank 
deposits. On the lending side, as well, commercial banks faced new 
competition as investment banks began to offer debt financing in non-
traditional forms short-term commercial paper, for example.102 
The convergence of activities among banks and securities firms also 
spurred the largest financial firms to grow larger. Deregulation drove 
extensive consolidation among investment and commercial banks. The mo  
striking fact about the industry . . . is the amount of consolidation that has 
taken place. 103 Between 1979 and 1994, the total number of banking 
organizations dropped by 36.4%, while gross total assets increased by 23.4% 
in real terms.104 A op- en  g o p of global ec i ie  nde i e  emained 
virtually unchanged from 2001-07,105 and those ten firms together took in 
nearly 60% of global proceeds from securities underwriting for 2005-07.106 
The big h ee  U.S. bank JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and 
Citigroup  controlled about 60% of the U.S. syndicated lending market 
from 2000-07. Around the same time, the big fo  U.S. ec i ie  fi m
 
98  Id. Before the GLB Act, BHC structures were permitted through the regulatory discretion of federal 
banking regulators. Jonathan R. Macey, The Business of Banking: Before and After Gramm Leach Bliley, 
25 J. CORP. L. 691, 692 (2000). Perhaps the most significant effect of the GLB Act was to allow investment 
banks to acquire commercial banks. Id. at 694. Commercial banks were already being allowed by regulators 
to acquire investment banking ope a ion  b  he ime of he GLB Ac  pa age. Id. 
99  See Cuñat & Guadalupe, supra note 88, at 497. 
100  On the heels of the RNA, the total number of bank branches per capita in the United States increased, as 
did the average number of banks operating at the state level and the average number of states in which a bank 
operated. See Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure, Quality, and Bank 
Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567, 585 (2006). 
101  The costs and pricing of banking services fell. See Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions, 
Industry Evolution, and Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41 J.L. & ECON. 239, 
249 53 (1998). States that dismantled intrastate branching restrictions saw faster growth after deregulation. 
See Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch 
Deregulation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639 (1996). Interstate competition also led to reallocation of assets to 
more efficient banks. See Stiroh & Strahan, supra note 90, at 804. 
102 Elisabeth de Fontenay, Do the Securities Laws Matter? The Rise of the Leveraged Loan Market, 39 J. 
CORP. L. 725, 739 (2014). 
103 Berger Kashyap Scalise, The Transformation of the U.S. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip 
It's Been, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 55, 66 (1995). 
104 Id. at 66-67 & tbl. 1. 
105 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins 
of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. RE . 963, 980 (2009). Thi  g o p a  comp i ed of he big 
h ee  U.S. banks Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Bank of America three major foreign banks Credit 
Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and UBS and he big fo  U.S. ec i ie  fi m Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers. Id. 
106 Id. at 981. 
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Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and Lehman Brothers
became active players in the leveraged loan market. That market saw rapid 
growth in response o in e o  demand  fo  highe -yielding investments 
and p i a e e i  fi m  need fo  le e aged b o  financing.107 Global 
leveraged lending grew from $250 billion in 1996 to $1.6 trillion in 2007.108 
This explosion of leveraged lending fueled a global LBO boom.109 
2. Junk Bonds and Leveraged Buyouts 
Up h o gh he 1970 , p blic fi m  balance hee  e e i e 
conservative. New public bond issues were typically investment grade, 
implying very low default risk, but also offering financing only for the most 
creditworthy firms. During this period, bank lending was also fairly 
straightforward, as described above. Banks generally held their loans to 
maturity; selling loans was rare. Relationship banking was the norm, and 
bank  p i a e info ma ion gleaned f om moni o ing hei  bo o e  a  an 
important asset, giving each bank some competitive edge with respect to its 
familiar borrowers.110 Thi  a  he adi ional o igina e-to-hold  model of 
syndicated lending, as compared to he mo e ecen  o igina e-to-di ib e  
model we discuss below.111 
The advent of junk bonds and the leveraged buyout boom of the 1980s 
taught companies to get comfortable with riskier capital structures.112 Rather 
than simply husbanding debt for operational needs, firms could tap 
burgeoning debt markets for acquisition purposes. Private equity firms 
regularized the practice of borrowing large sums to take firms private, 
typically using a mix of bank loans and junk bonds, thereby increasing 
demand for both. This demand in turn led to more and more syndicated 
lending, which enabled banks to diversify risk by sharing the funding of large 
corporate loans.113 
 
107 Id. at 982-83. 
108 Comm. on the Global Fin. System, Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets 11 graph 2.2, 17-21 
(CGFS Papers, Working Paper No. 30, 2008), available at www.bis.org/publ/cgfs30.htm. By 2004, global 
leveraged lending was at $700 billion; it hit $900 billion in 2005 and $1.2 trillion in 2006. Id. 
109 Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2007, at 44-46, 
49-50; Edward I. Altman, Global Debt Markets in 2007: New Paradigm or the Great Credit Bubble?, 19 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2007, at 17, 24-25. More than half the leveraged loans issued in the U.S. and 
Europe from 2004-07 were used to finance LBOs and other corporate transactions. Comm. on the Global 
Fin. System, supra note 108, 14 graph 2.6.  
110 E.g., Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders, and Anand Srinivasan, Lending 
Relationships and Loan Contract Terms, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1141, 1141-42 (2011) (showing that reduced 
information asymmetry leads to lower loan spreads, especially for opaque borrowers). 
111 Simons, supra note 64, at 45-46; de Fontenay, supra note 102, at 739.  
112 So-called j nk bond ,  al o efe ed o a  high-yield debt, are riskier than investment grade bonds. Bonds 
i h a S anda d & Poo  a ing belo  BBB- o  a Mood  a ing belo  Baa3 a e gene all  con ide ed belo  
investment grade. S&P GLOBAL, A SYNDICATED LOAN PRIMER 9 (April 2016); available at 
https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/2016%20US%20Loan%20Primer.pdf. A leveraged buyout is a merger 
transaction in which a private equity firm pays for control of the target using primarily borrowed funds, much 
of hich i  colla e ali ed b  he a ge  a e . [ci e] 
113 Bridget Marsh & Tess Virmani, Loan Syndications and Trading: An Overview of the Syndicated Loan 
Market, in LENDING & SECURED FINANCE 2 (2020), available at https://iclg.com/practice-areas/lending-and-
secured-finance-laws-and-regulations/01-loan-syndications-and-trading-an-overview-of-the-syndicated-
loan-market. 
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One consequence of the greater comfort with more highly leveraged 
capital structures has been the expansion of leveraged lending bank lending 
to below-investment-grade firms. Because leveraged loans face higher 
default risk than investment grade loans, borrowers face steeper pricing for 
both loan spreads and arranger fees. The prospective high returns to lenders 
attracted significant investor interest beginning in the mid-1990s, as non-
bank financial in i ion  ( in i ional lenders,  also sometimes called 
hado  bank ) jumped into the leveraged loan market.114 CLOs, mutual 
funds, pension funds, and insurance companies have been the most active 
institutional lenders in the leveraged loan market.115  
3. Modernizing Bank Capital 
Modernized bank capital rules helped to shape the emergence and 
contours of the leveraged loan market. Beginning in the 1970s, central 
bankers in ten economically advanced countries began to meet regularly to 
craft and coordinate improvements to the quality of banking supervision 
worldwide. This group became the Basel Committee,116 which over the past 
decades has established international standards and practices for banking 
regulation. Among other things, the Basel Committee introduced and refined 
bank capital rules. Bank capital acts as a buffer against losses, analogous to 
corporate equity, and banking regulations specify minimum capital 
requirements for banks to operate. The minimum capital requirements are 
expressed as a ratio of capital to assets. During the 1980s, the Basel 
Committee introduced risk weighting for assets. Different types of assets 
implicate different types and levels of risk, so the Basel risk-weighted assets 
(RWA) approach assigns bank assets to various risk categories, with riskier 
categories requiring more capital. For example, under Basel I, commercial 
loans were weighted at 100%; residential mortgages were weighted at only 
50%; and sovereign debt incurred a 0% weighting that is, sovereign debt 
required no corresponding capital buffer. Over time, the Basel Committee set 
three important minimum capital-to-RWA ratios: one for co e  o  ie  1  
capital; a similar ratio for total capital, which includes tier 1 capital plus 
 
114 Allison A. Taylor & Ruth Yang, Evoluation of the Primary and Secondary Leveraged Loan Markets, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS AND TRADING 24 (2007) ( The e nonbank b e  inc ea ed 
demand for leveraged loan products, thereby enabling the larger agent banks to underwrite and distribute 
inc ea ingl  bigge  loan . ) (he einaf e  HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS). 
115 Jerome H. Powell, Business Debt and Our Dynamic Financial System, Remarks by Jerome H. Powell, 
Chair, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 4 & fig. 4 (May 20, 2019). 
116 The Committee has since expanded to include 45 institutions from 28 jurisdictions. BANK OF 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, HISTORY OF THE BASEL COMMITTEE, available at 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm. 
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additional items;117 and a common e i  ie  1  o  CET1  a io, which 
uses a definition of capital narrower than tier 1.118   
Consistent with the modern portfolio theory behind these risk-based 
capital rules, banks were pushed to diversify their loan portfolios.119 The new 
capital rules deterred banks from holding just a relative handful of large loans 
confined to a particular region or locality. Instead, banks were incentivized 
to hold larger passels of smaller loans that were geographically more 
balanced.120 More generally, by the early 2000s, with portfolio management 
being the order of the day, a bank could no longer simply originate loans 
based on a one-time risk assessment and hold the loans to maturity. Instead, 
portfolio rebalancing meant some amount of loan selling. So rather than 
continuing with a straight originate-to-hold approach to lending, banks began 
to pare their portfolios to reduce regulatory capital costs. One 2002 survey of 
41 prominent banks explored their experience with the nascent practice of 
portfolio management. The survey showed that 73% of respondents had 
transferred a loan to a CLO, and that eg la o  capi al  concerns were the 
most important motivation.121 Asked to rank four tools for loan portfolio 
management, respondents ranked loan ale  and ading  as the second most 
important tool, af e  app o al/ disapproval of new business and renewals/ 
non ene al of e i ing b ine . 122 With new technology to measure risk 
and diversification, banks learned to optimize their portfolios and enhance 
their returns with the judicious selling of loans.123  
A secondary loan market thus emerged, with originate-to-distribute 
lending and plenty of non-bank lenders to populate that market. 
 
117 Tier 1 includes common ockholde  e i , nonc m la i e pe pe al p efe ed ock, mino i  in e e  
in consolidated subsidiaries, and some other items. Total capital incorporates tier 2 capital, which includes 
allowances for loan losses, cumulative preferred stock, long-term preferred stock, and some subordinated 
debt. Tier 2 capital also cannot exceed tier 1 capital. Joseph G. Haubrich, A Brief History of Bank Capital 
Requirements in the United States, ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 4 & 6 n.6 (FRB Cleveland) No. 2020-05 (Feb. 
28, 2020). 
118 Id. at 4. Basel III and the Dodd-F ank Ac  al o c ea ed capi al b ffe  fo  he la ge bank . A capi al 
conservation buffer (CCB) precludes large banks from making capital distributions if their capital is less than 
2.5% above the minimum ratio. Global systematically important banks (GSIBs) face a special surcharge 
meant to offset systemic risk. GSIBs are also required to meet a total loss absorbing capacity (TLAC) 
threshold, which is a minimum ratio of equity plus long-term debt. The requirement for a countercyclical 
capi al b ffe  (CC B) i  mean  o ai e bank  capi al e i emen  d ing an economic e pan ion, e en iall  
to moderate a potentially overheating economy. Id. at 5. 
119 E.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, Comprehensive Version, BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL 
SETTLEMENTS (June 2006), available at https://www.fsb.org/2006/06/cos_060601/. See also de Fontenay, 
supra note 102, at 739-41. 
120 Whitehead, supra note 86, at 654-65 (no ing ha  ne  eg la o  capi al e i emen  made i  mo e 
e pen i e fo  bank  o con in e he lending b ine  a  he  had befo e,  and man  [bank ] n[ed] o a 
defensive, portfolio-based strategy in o de  o minimi e hei  o e all c edi  co . ). 
121 Charles Smithson, Stuart Brannan, David Mengle & Mark Zmiewski, Results from the 2002 Survey of 
Credit Portfolio Management Practices 5 (2002); available at https://studylib.net/doc/8175108/2002-survey-
of-credit-portfolio-management-practices. Most of the institutions (81%) were commercial banks 
headquartered in North America or Europe. Id. at 2. 
122 Id. The mean ank fo  loan ale  and ading  a  2.74. The mean ank fo  app o al/ di app o al of 
ne  b ine  a  1.10. Id. 
123 Whitehead, supra note 86, at 655-56 & n.103 (noting the development of credit portfolio modeling and 
ne  me hod  fo  mea ing loan po folio  i k and e n cha ac e i ic ). 
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4. Securitization: Collateralized Loan Obligations 
CLOs deserve special mention. Sixty-some percent of outstanding 
leveraged loans are securitized:124 the loan is sold to a special purpose vehicle 
(SPV), hich cceed  o he loan  ca h flo  and control rights. The SPV 
buys many loans, or slices of syndicated loans, and then issues securities
colla e ali ed loan obliga ion ,  o  CLO to investors, backed by the cash 
flows of the loans in the SPV.125 The CLO securities are tranched, such that 
the senior-most securities are the safest and most highly rated. More junior 
tranches enjoy a higher interest rate for having to shoulder greater risk. The 
lowest tranches typically suffer the first losses in the collateral pool. 
Securitization is an ever-expanding tool of modern finance, in both its sheer 
dollar volume and the steadily growing variety of its sources of cash flows. 
CLOs have become the major holders of leveraged loans. A 
conventional wisdom suggests that CLO loans face not only weak covenants 
but also anemic monitoring, though existing evidence appears mixed.126 For 
present purposes, we note CLO securitization as an important driver of the 
leveraged loan market. 
C. The Shape of Leveraged Lending 
With the metamorphosis to syndicated originate-to-distribute lending 
and loan trading, it was a short step to creating different types of loans for 
different types of lenders for the leveraged loan market. While banks still 
typically act as arrangers, they traditionally prefer to hold what is known as 
p o a a  deb , a package ha  includes a revolving loan with traditional 
financial covenants,127 and an amortizing term loan (typically referred to as 
 
124 Powell, supra note 115, at 4 (noting that 62% of then-outstanding leveraged loans were held by CLOs). 
Mutual funds, the next largest holders of leveraged loans, own about 20% of the market. Id. 
125 CLO  i  gene all  used to refer to not only the loan-backed bonds but also the entire structured finance 
transaction or entity. A typical CLO may include over a hundred different loans, with the average loan size 
ranging from $2 million to $3 million. Efraim Benmelech, Jennifer Dlugosz & Victoria Ivashina, 
Securitization without Adverse Selection, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 91, 94 (2012). In 2015, the average CLO held 
$500 million to $600 million in principal amount of loans spread over an average of 140 borrowers. Stavros 
Peristani & João A.C. Santos, Investigating the Trading Activity of CLO Portfolio Managers, LIBERTY 
STREET ECON. (Aug. 3, 2015); available at 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/08/investigating-the-trading-activity-of-clo-portfolio-
managers.html.  
126 Compare Yihui Wang & Han Xia, Do Lenders Still Monitor When They Can Securitize Loans?, 27 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2354 (2014); Vitaly M. Board & João A.C. Santos, Does Securitization of Corporate Loans Lead 
to Riskier Lending?, 47 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 415 (2015) (finding that securitized leveraged loans 
perform worse than non-securitized loans); with Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127; Benmelech, et al., supra 
note 125 (finding no consistent evidence that securitized leveraged loans performed worse than unsecuritized 
loans).  
127 Mitchell Berlin, Greg Nini & Edison G. Yu, Concentration of Control Rights in Leveraged Loan 
Syndicates, 137 J. FIN. ECON. 249, 250 (2020) (noting that the line of credit in a leveraged loan deal nearly 
always contains traditional financial covenants, even if no term loan does). A revolving loan is an unfunded 
loan that allows the borrower repeatedly to draw and then repay funds as the borrower wishes during the life 
of the loan, up to a specified aggregate limit, much like a credit card. Interest is charged only for the periods 
and amounts that funds are outstanding. Banks typically originate and manage revolving loans. An amortizing 
term loan typically requires regular periodic payments of the same amount over the life of the loan, with each 
payment consisting of two components: (a) an amount that pays off the accrued interest from the preceding 
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the TLA).128 The package is pro rata insofar as each lender in the syndication 
commits to a share of the revolver equal to its share of the TLA.129 
Institutional lenders, by contrast, prefer riskier loans, typically non-
amo i ing e m loan , called TLB . The B  efe  o he b lle  na e of 
the loan. Maturity is typically longer than for the TLA loan, and in the 
absence of amortization, the borrower makes only regular periodic interest 
payments over the life of the loan. The entire principal amount ( he b lle ) 
is due at maturity.130 In i ional lende  f nd he lion  ha e of le e aged 
loans.131 Loan credit ratings and secondary market trading standards have 
greatly facilitated institutional trading.132  
Institutional lenders can take on these riskier loans because they are 
free of the capital requirements and stringent regulation applied to 
commercial banks. This regulatory differential has led to a symbiotic 
arbitrage, where banks arrange risky loans that they are not willing to hold 
on their own books, but instead sell to institutional lenders.133 This approach 
has facilitated he o igina e-to-di ib e  model of loan ndica ion. While 
continuing their traditional relationship lending, banks also create 
institutional tranches for the shadow banks in the form of riskier TLBs. Like 
the revolving loans, leveraged term loans are typically secured by first 
priority liens on collateral, sharing equal priority with the revolving loan. As 
syndicated lending has become more specialized, it has also become common 
 
period; and (b) an amount for reduction of principal. Over the life of the loan, the interest component 
decreases monotonically while the principal component does just the opposite, such that the final payment 
retires the remaining principal amount, as well as the remaining small sliver of interest due. [cite] 
128 An amortizing loan is a loan with a repayment schedule of equal periodic payments over the life of the 
loan. Each periodic payment includes some repayment of principal, as well as interest on the remaining 
principal amount. Payments early on the life of the loan are comprised primarily of interest, with just a small 
principal repayment component. With each succeeding payment, the interest component decreases because 
the unpaid principal amount decreases with each payment while the principal repayment component 
increases. The very last payment, which retires the loan, is comprised almost entirely of principal, with just 
a sliver of interest. See Julia Kagan, Amortized Loan, INVESTOPEDIA (updated Oct. 30, 2020), available at 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/amortized_loan.asp. 
129 S&P GLOBAL, LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA (LCD): LEVERAGED LOAN PRIMER 8 (2020); 
available at https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/documents/lcd-primer-leveraged-
loans_ltr_updated.pdf. By the late 2000s, amortizing term loans became less common, as institutional lenders 
preferred the revolver/ institutional term loan (i.e., non-amortizing) arrangement. Id. at 6. 
130 Id. at 6; HANDBOOK OF LOAN SYNDICATIONS, supra note 114, a  717. Thi  b lle  fea e i  no  
necessarily as draconian as it may sound. Corporate borrowers will typically honor their repayment 
commitment by refinancing taking out a new loan to repay the maturing loan. When multiple institutional 
term loan tranches are created at the same time, they are typically named in alphabetical order, which 
coincides with maturity order. For example, the TLB may mature in six years, the TLC in seven years, and 
so on. Id.  
131 Banks held less than 8% of leveraged loans as of the end of 2018. Powell, supra note 115, at 5 & fig. 4. 
132 In 2007, institutional lenders funded 62% of primary leveraged loan issuance. Victoria Ivashina & Zheng 
Sun, Institutional Demand Pressure and the Cost of Corporate Loans,99 J. FIN. ECON. 500, 501(2011).  
133 Moreover,  
There is only so much safety and soundness regulators can do about this, for much of the market is 
populated by nonbank lenders and nonbank purchasers and so lies outside of their immediate reach . . . 
[R]egulatory initiatives against the banks are thought to have played a causative role in the nonbank 
surge. 
Bratton & Levitin, supra note 16, at 104. See also Andrew Berlin, Regulated Banks Soften Stance on 
Leveraged Lending Guidance, REUTERS (Apr. 19, 2018) (explaining the regulatory easing by the Fed and 
OCC enabling debt packages with leverage of up to 7.75 times in 2018, as compared to the six-times leverage 
cap in 2013). 
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ha  bank  hold onl  e ol e , lea ing he bo o e  e m loan  o he 
shadow banks.134 
With debt investors continually on the hunt for higher yields, the US 
leveraged loan market has exploded since the financial crisis, more than 
doubling in size,135 as Figure 1 shows below. By the end of 2019, the 
leveraged loan market was worth $1.2 trillion, with institutional lenders 
holding 90% of that market.136 A  he ame ime, on he bo o e  ide, 70% 
of US companies are rated below investment grade,137 including household 




FIGURE 1: GROWTH IN LEVERAGED & COV-LITE LOANS 





D. Fear of Flying: Reg la o  Vie  
Debt markets have become far more comfortable with riskier loans than 
in previous years. Regulators, rating agencies, and other debt market 
observers worry that market demand for leveraged loans has enabled 
 
134 Edison Yu, Banking Trends: Measuring Cov-Lite Right, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILADELPHIA 3 (2018). 
135 From the end of 2008 to Q1 2019, outstanding institutional leveraged loans grew by 101%. Frank Martin-
Buck, Leveraged Lending and Corporate Borrowing: Increased Reliance on Capital Markets, with Important 
Bank Links, 13 FDIC Q. 41, 43 (2019). 
136 Sierra, supra note 8. In the mid-1990s, banks funded more than 70% of institutional leveraged loans. 
Martin-Buck, supra note 135, at 45.  
137 SIFMA, LEVERAGE LENDING FAQ & FACT SHEET 2 (2019); available at https://www.sifma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/Leverage-Lending-FAQ.pdf. 
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borrowers to cut deals with increasingly weaker covenants.138 Historically, 
leveraged loans typically included financial maintenance covenants. The 
borrower committed to maintaining a certain ratio of debt to cash flow, for 
example, or a cap on total debt. Virtually all leveraged loans included 
maintenance covenants in the early 2000s.139 By 2007, 29% of new loans
so-called co enan -li e  o  co -li e  loan omitted these covenants. 
In ead, loan  migh  incl de inc ence  co enan , hich e i e 
compliance with caps or ratios only when the borrower pursues a specified 
significant action like issuing new debt or dividends, or making an 
acquisition. While the proportion of cov-lite loans fell in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, cov-lite roared back through 2018 to comprise 85% of new 
loans.140 
In addition to weakened covenants and the associated corporate 
governance implications, other risk-enhancing practices have emerged as 
well in recent years. Not only has reported leverage increased, but the 
g o ing p ac ice of ea ning  add-back  suggests that actual leverage may 
be even more worrisome. With acquisitions, private equity buyouts, and other 
extraordinary transactions, sponsors and targets naturally expect to show 
synergies or operational improvements that justify valuations exceeding the 
costs of the deal. With the understandable aim of presenting a fair picture of 
he bo o e  f e ea ning  follo ing an e ao dina  an ac ion, he 
borrower often adds back non-recurring items that affect cash flows or 
accruals.141 
Lenders in turn will concur with borrowe  p a d adj men  o 
EBITDA to reflect this assumed augmentation of value. Borrowers of course 
may end up overstating adjusted EBITDA through add-backs, which then 
nde a e  he a ge  deb -to-EBITDA ratio, a typical baseline leverage 
measure.142 Add-backs are becoming more and more common. Their 
magnitudes have raised concerns from regulators. The Financial Stability 
Board estimates EBITDA adjustments of 15-30% for incurrence covenants 
 
138 William W. Bratton, Bond and Loan Covenants, Theory and Practice, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 461, 478-79 
(2016). See also Aaron Weinman, Demand for Leveraged Loans Ignites Market, Concerns on Risk, REUTERS 
(Feb. 5, 2020) ( In e o  pocke  a e fl h i h ca h looking fo  a home, and bo o e  ha e le e aged 
this to either reprice their debt at ultra-low rates or obtain cheap new cash for acquisitions that may have been 
difficult to execute a year ago. ). 
139 Martin-Buck, supra note 135, at 44. One study of public company credit agreements from 1996 2005 
found that almost 97 percent included at least one financial covenant. Michael R. Roberts & Amir Sufi, 
Control Rights and Capital Structure: An Empirical Investigation, 64 J. FIN. 1657, 1662 (2009). 
140 Id. 
141 For example, as part of the spin-off of Engility Holdings, Inc. by L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc. in 
July, 2012, Engility entered into a $400 million credit agreement with Bank of America, as Administrative 
Agen . Engili  defini ion of Con olida ed EBITDA runs for 520 words, and includes addbacks not only 
fo  in e e , a e , dep ecia ion, and amo i a ion. I  al o add  back ce ain non-cash stock-based 
compen a ion e pen e ,  ce ain co  a ing , ope a ing e pen e ed c ion  and ne gie  p ojec ed by the 
Borrower in good faith to be realized . . . ,  ce ain e ao dina  o  non-recurring charges, expenses or 
lo e ," and ce ain o he  non-ca h cha ge , e pen e  o  lo e .  CREDIT AGREEMENT, DATED AS OF JULY 
17, 2012, AMONG ENGILITY HOLDINGS, INC., ENGILITY CORPORATION, BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., AS 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENT, AND THE LENDERS FROM TIME TO TIME PARTY HERETO 7-; available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1544229/000119312512309118/d381537dex101.htm. 
142 Financial Stability Board, Vulnerabilities Associated with Leveraged Loans and Collateralised Loan 
Obligations 9 (2019). 
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in current deals.143 S die  b  bo h S anda d & Poo  and Mood s show that 
fi m  o  EBITDA p ojec ion  of en fall ma e iall  ho  in he o ea  
post-closing.144 
While Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell has expressed 
confidence ha  he banking em i  f ndamen all  onge  and mo e 
e ilien  han d ing he financial c i i , he also offers some caution in mid-
2019: 
 
Business debt has clearly reached a level that should give businesses 
and investors reason to pause and reflect. . . . Many measures confirm 
that the business sector has significantly increased its borrowing as 
the economy has expanded over the past decade. Business debt 
relative to the size of the economy is at historic highs. . . . And 
investment-grade corporate debt has shifted closer to the edge of 
speculative grade. . . . Among investment-grade bonds, a near-record 
fraction is at the lowest rating . . . . [U]nderwriting standards have 
weakened. With leveraged loans, covenants intended to protect 
lenders may be an endangered species; more loans now feature high 
debt-to-earnings ratios; and the use of optimistic projections . . . is 
becoming more common.145 
 
In his 2015 speech on financial stability, then-Fed Board Member Powell 
made similar remarks about the dearth of covenants, no ing ha  [p]rice and 
non-price terms in the syndicated leveraged loan market have been highly 
favorable to borrowers . . . . The share of loan agreements that lack traditional 
main enance co enan  inc ea ed o hi o ic high . 146 
Ea lie , in p ing of 2013, U.S. bank eg la o  had i ed In e agenc  
G idance on Le e aged Lending  (IGLL), offe ing o nd p ac ice  fo  
le e aged finance ac i i ie .  The G idance cautioned that financial 
in i ion  ho ld . . . no  nnece a il  heigh en i k  b  o igina ing poo l  
nde i en loan ,  and bemoaned ha  deb  ag eemen  ha e f e en l  
included features that provided relatively limited lender protection including 
 
143 Id. a  9. C en  deal  co e  deal  h o gh he end of 2018. Id. at n.31. 
144 S&P GLOBAL, When the Credit Cycle Turns: The EBITDA Add-Back Fallacy (Sept. 24, 2018), available 
at https://www.spglobal.com/en/research-insights/articles/when-the-credit-cycle-turns-the-ebitda-add-back-
fallacy; S&P GLOBAL, Comments-When the Cycle Turns: The Continued Attack of the EBITDA Add-Back 
(Sept. 19, 2019), available at https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/research/articles/190919-when-the-
cycle-turns-the-continued-attack-of-the-ebitda-add-back-11156255; MOODY S, Research: Announcement: 
EMEA Spec-Grade Firms Are Making Higher Earnings Adjustments to Attract Investors (June 27, 2018), 
available at https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-EMEA-spec-grade-firms-are-making-higher-
earnings-adjustments--PR_385895. 
145 Powell, supra note 115, at 2-4. At the same time, Chairman Powell noted that capital levels and liquidity 
are much higher at bank holding companies than before the financial crisis, and more generally that the 
financial system is better prepared for an economic downturn, should it arise. Id. at 8, 11. 
146 Jerome H. Powell, Financial Institutions, Financial Markets, and Financial Stability, Remarks by Jerome 
H. Powell, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 11 & fig. 9 & 10 (Feb. 18, 2015).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3882862
 
Do Lenders Still Monitor? 
Leveraged Lending and the Search for Covenants 
 28  
. . . the absence of meaningful maintenance covenants in loan agreements  
and the participation of unregulated investors. 147 
The Kansas City Fed has also recently raised concerns with the growing 
absence of covenant protections: 
 
[M]an  ob e e  concerns stem from reduced credit enhancement 
protections on syndicated loans. Covenants and other borrower 
protections have declined during the post-crisis period, likely leaving 
lenders with less monitoring authority and fewer recourse channels 
should borrowers default on their loans. . . . Declining borrower 
protections could also lead to lower recovery rates than in the past if 
firms were to default.148 
 
 
III. THE NEW LENDER GOVERNANCE 
The rise in leveraged and cov-lite loans, and the increasing packaging 
of these loans into CLOs, has created concerns about systemic risk and the 
future of lender governance. Law and finance scholars worry that the 
beneficent effects of lender governance may fall by the wayside as the 
explosive demand for leveraged loans seems to lead to weakened covenants 
and enforcement. The larger and more diverse institutional syndicates 
associated with leveraged loans may create greater holdout opportunities and 
renegotiation frictions. Going cov-lite tends to avoid these holdout problems, 
thereby potentially streamlining the resolution of conflict among syndicate 
members and the borrower.149 Lender governance could weaken, however.  
 
147 Emphasis supplied. In addi ion, he capi al c e  and epa men  p o pec  fo  ome an ac ion  . . . 
ha e a  ime  been agg e i e,  and managemen  info ma ion ems (MIS) at some institutions have 
p o en le  han a i fac o  in acc a el  agg ega ing e po e  on a imel  ba i .  Boa d of Go e no  of 
the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation & Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending 1-2 (March 21, 2013). Studies show that banks 
gene all  did no  eac  hen IGLL a  fi  i ed. In ead, onl  i h he Fed  i ance of a cla if ing FAQ 
on November 7, 2014 did banks respond. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation & Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) for 
Implementing March 201 Interagency Guidance on Leveraged Lending (Nov. 7, 2014). The most heavily 
supervised banks (subject to oversight by the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee (LISCC) 
reduced leveraged lending activity significantly, to levels below the pre-IGLL period. Market share for 
LISCC banks declined by 11 (5) percentage points in number (volume) of leveraged loans from November 
2014  December 2015. Non-LISCC banks did not change their leveraged lending levels in response to the 
IGLL or the subsequent clarifying FAQ. Nonbanks increased their leveraged lending throughout, taking 
significant market share away from banks. By number of loans, nonbanks increased market share by over 
50%; dollar volume more than doubled. This should not be too surprising, since supervisory guidance directly 
affects only banks. Post-FAQ, borrowers from a LISCC bank were also more likely to switch to nonbank 
lenders. Sooji Kim, Matthew C. Plosser & João A.C. Santos, Macroprudential Policy and the Revolving Door 
of Risk: Lessons from Leveraged Lending Guidance, 34 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 17, 17-18 (2018). Similar 
results obtain for US and foreign banks versus nonbanks. Paul Calem, Ricardo Correa & Seung Jung Lee, 
Prudential Policies and Their Impact on Credit in the United States, 42 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 1, 14 & 15 
tbl. 11 (2020). Of course, moving risky lending away from banks and toward nonbanks may not have reduced 
financial system risk overall. 
148 W. Blake Marsh & Seung Jung Lee, Wha  D i ing Le e aged Loan Sp ead , FED. RES. BANK OF 
KANSAS CITY: THE MACRO BULLETIN 4 (Feb. 27, 2019). 
149 Matthew T. Billett, Redouane Elkamhi, Latchezar Popov & Raunaq S. Pungaliya, Bank Skin in the Game 
and Loan Contract Design: Evidence from Covenant-Lite Loans, 51 J. FIN. QUANT. ANALYSIS 839 (2016). 
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Over the past few decades, covenant- and loan structure and strategy 
have evolved to address the perceived increased risks from excessive 
leverage and cov-lite lending. Private ordering in loan contracts has emerged 
o amelio a e eg la o  conce n  i h e pec  o bo h he pe cei ed dearth 
of covenant constraints and the potential excesses of add-backs. 
Split control rights enable the application of traditional financial 
maintenance covenants even to cov-lite loans, which ordinarily contain no 
such covenants. The traditional covenants are contained in the revolving loan 
agreement that typically accompanies leveraged and cov-lite term loans in a 
multi-loan deal. So traditional covenants apply to the borrower, even though 
not every loan in the deal package may reflect those same covenants. At the 
same time, only the bank lenders on the revolving loan typically enjoy the 
right to renegotiate or waive violations of the covenants in the deal. With split 
control, cov-lite loans do not skirt or weaken covenant constraints. Instead, 
split control facilitates renegotiation by concentrating control rights with a 
smaller, more cohesive subset of lenders the bank lenders on the revolving 
credit agreement to discipline the borrower.   
Similarly, while add-backs may cause trepidation for regulators, 
upward adjustments to EBITDA may do more than simply massage 
bo o e  le e age a io . New research by Badawi, Dyreng, de Fontenay 
and Hills (BDDH) suggests that permissive use of add-backs may improve 
the informativeness of signals to lende  abo  he bo o e  condi ion. 
Better information with respect to EBITDA may eliminate noisy features of 
accounting earnings, such that add-backs may facilitate tighter covenants 
while also reducing the incidence of false positive violations, thereby 
avoiding costly renegotiation.150 Permissiveness with respect to add-backs 
correlates with covenant tightness. 
More generally, covenants appear to have become more efficient. Cash 
flow covenants have largely replaced balance sheet covenants in private loan 
agreements. Cash flow covenants are more discriminating. Financial 
covenants have also become less restrictive in terms of both the number of 
covenants in a given loan agreement and their strictness, leading to fewer 
reported violations, as well as fewer false positives.151  
 
A. Split Control 
Simply tracking the presence or absence of covenants in a particular 
loan may not accurately characterize the covenant constraints at play. In a 
world of leveraged lending with different types of lending institutions 
pursuing different loan structures, a loan deal may incorporate multiple loans 
with non-uniform features, such as varying maturity or covenant structure.152 
 
150 Adam B. Badawi, Scott D. Dyreng, Elisabeth de Fontenay & Robert W. Hills, Contractual Complexity in 
Debt Agreements: The Case of EBITDA, Working Paper (May 2021); available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3455497.  
151 See infra Part III.C. 
152 S&P GLOBAL, LEVERAGED COMMENTARY & DATA (LCD): LEVERAGED LOAN PRIMER 6 (2020); 
available at https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LCD%20Loan%20Primer.pdf. 
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In an important recent study, Berlin, Nini & Yu (BNY) show that while 
institutional leveraged loans and cov-lite loans have proliferated in recent 
years, very few loan deals which involve contemporaneous or near-
contemporaneous origination of multiple loans to a single borrower are 
issued without traditional maintenance covenants.153 Banks are partial to 
revolving loans, which typically include financial maintenance covenants. In 
many of the deals, the institutional term loans include identical covenants. 
But whether they do or not, only the banks, and not the institutional lenders, 
enjoy the right to renegotiate the covenants or waive violations.154 BNY call 
this pli  con ol,  which allows a subset of lenders the revolver lenders, 
typically to discipline the borrower firm. Other lenders in the deal
typically, the institutional lenders have no say in the renegotiation. This 
split control is meant to concentrate control rights with a smaller group of 
lenders. This pared-down set of bank lenders offers a tighter and more 
cohesive workout group to negotiate with the borrower firm, thereby 
reducing holdout and bargaining costs.155  
Though the vast majority of outstanding leveraged loans appears to be 
cov-lite, then, split control rights created at the deal level complexify the 
situation somewhat. That very few leveraged loan contracts specify 
maintenance covenants does not imply that covenant constraints are absent. 
Regulators and rating agencies may therefore be too quick to characterize 
cov-lite loans as simply profligate lending. Instead, they may be 
overestimating the risks in the leveraged loan market.  
BNY study loans from 2005-14.156 Completely cov-lite deals comprise 
less than 2% of their sample.157 Contrast this with the proportion of cov-lite 
loans in the sample. In 2005, cov-lite term loans were close to zero; by 2014, 
close to 40% were cov-lite. And as earlier noted, by 2018, cov-lite loans 
comprised about 85% of the leveraged loan market by volume.158 At the same 
time, the frequency of deals with no maintenance covenant is only 1% and 
has not increased in recent years.159 So almost all leveraged loan borrowers 
are subject to financial covenants in at least one of their loans, typically the 
revolving line of credit.  
Consistent with the specialized monitoring that split control hopes to 
accomplish, leveraged loan syndicates are structured to facilitate monitoring 
in the presence of split control rights. Compared to deals without split control, 
 
153 Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 250. 
154 In no case were the revolving lenders excluded from control in he BNY ample. So pli  con ol  
essentially means that a term loan was excluded from the control features provided by covenants. Id. at 255. 
Term loans also include a cross-default provision, such that a default in the revolver also triggers a default in 
the term loan(s). Id. at 250. 
155 Id. at 256. 
156 BNY  ample i  limi ed o deal  ha  incl de bo h a e ol ing line of c edi  and a e m loan. Id. at 250 & 
fig. 1 note. For that sample, 65% of deals involve a revolver and term loan with identical financial covenants. 
Email from Greg Nini (Jan. 29, 2021). An Online Appendix extends the sample period through the second 
quarter of 2018, showing about a 20% increase in the frequency of split control rights from 2014. Berlin, 
Nini & Yu, supra note 127, Online Appendix at 12-13 & fig. OA.1; available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3459733. 
157 Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 250.  
158 Martin-Buck, supra note 135, at 44.  
159 Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 255. 
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the revolving loan syndicate is more concentrated (has fewer lenders), the 
mean lende  commi men  i  la ge , and most importantly, he mean agen  
commitment is larger, both by dollar amount and share of the total 
commitment,160 similar to traditional syndicated lending.161 Moreover, 
borrowers subject to split control rights violate covenants at the same rate as 
other firms,162 which suggests that split control rights do work to enforce the 
discipline of financial covenants. 
Split control enables the covenants, monitoring, and renegotiation that 
are customary in traditional syndicated lending. The agent bank leads the 
syndicate, taking a significant stake in the loan to ensure other syndicate 
members against moral hazard. As earlier described, covenants act as a 
screening mechanism ex ante and as a trip wire ex post, causing the agent to 
a e  he bo o e  i a ion and ei he  enego ia e he co enan  o  ai e 
the violation. This applies even for loans held by CLOs.163 This monitoring 
benefits not only the banks, but also bondholders and equity holders.164 
Split control helps address bargaining frictions among leveraged 
lenders induced by the large presence of institutional lenders. The 
institutional tranches of a leveraged loan deal typically involve more lenders 
and more diverse lenders than does a bank tranche.165 Institutional lenders 
also experience fewer repeat interactions with each other, so relationships 
among them will be less likely. Finally, a lively secondary market in 
institutional leveraged loans means that syndicate members will change over 
the life of the loan. These various features imply that institutional loans are 
more difficult to renegotiate.166 In BNY  ample, he incidence of pli  
control rights is almost four times more likely among deals with an 
institutional tranche.167 Split control rights have emerged to reduce 
renegotiation costs, and are far more prevalent with institutional deals than 
deals without an institutional tranche.168  
 
160 Id. at 258-59 & tbl. 4. 
161 See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text. 
162 Id. at 250. 
163 Id. at 251. 
164 James, supra note 4, at 219; Nini, Smith & Sufi, supra note 5; Datta, Datta & Patel, supra note 4, at 437.  
165 In BNY  ample, he mean n mbe  of lende  in an in i ional e m loan (defined as a deal containing 
an institutional tranche) is nine times greater than for other term loans (191 versus 20). Berlin, Nini & Yu, 
supra note 127, at 261 & tbl. 6. 
166 Cem Demiroglu & Christopher M. James, Bank Loans and Troubled Debt Restructurings, 118 J. FIN. 
ECON. 192 (2015); Matthew G. Osborn, The Cost of Easy Credit: Loan Contracting with Non-Bank Investors, 
Working Paper (Nov. 3, 2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2499798; ; Mehdi Beyhaghi, Ca 
Nguyen & John K. Wald, Institutional Investors and Loan Dynamics: Evidence from Loan Renegotiations, 
56 J. CORP. FIN. 482 (2019) (showing that nonbanks are more likely to exit a syndicate than participate in 
renegotiation). 
167 Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 251. BNY also rule out alternative explanations for the rise of split 
control rights. Id. 
168 Id. at 258-61 & fig. 3 & tbl. 5. BNY note that during the financial crisis, the average fee for a covenant 
modification following a violation was 80% higher for institutional loans than for noninstitutional loans, 
before the widespread use of split control rights. Id. at 262-23 & tbl. 7. In an Online Appendix, BNY extend 
their sample though the second quarter of 2018, showing that the frequency of split control rights has 
increased significantly. Online App. at 13-14 & fig. OA.1 & tbl. OA.4. 
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The advent of split control rights should cause some rethinking of the 
traditional assumptions surrounding leveraged and cov-lite loans.169 Once 
individual loans are matched with the deals that spawned them, lender 
governance seems again to be pervasive. Moreover, failing to account for 
split control may lead to bias or erroneous conclusions. For example, analyses 
attempting to explain cov-lite loan spreads or covenant tightness may miss 
the mark if only loan-level but not deal-level covenant structure is 
considered. 
 
B. Earnings Add-backs and Informativeness 
In addition to growth in leveraged and cov-lite loans, earnings add-
backs have caused concern with regulators.170 Add-backs may exacerbate the 
end o a d highe  le e age, gi en EBITDA  ke  ole in le e age mea e  
for financial covenants.171 Private debt contracts often include bespoke 
accounting provisions that allow for adjustments to financial performance 
covenant earnings. According to one study, such adjustments to FASB-
GAAP-based net income and FASB-GAAP-based EBITDA increase income 
by economically large amounts. Performance covenant earnings exceed 
FASB-GAAP net income for more than 99% of loan contracts, and exceed 
FASB-GAAP EBITDA for more than 84% of contracts. Magnitudes are also 
large: for the median firm, FASB-GAAP net income is about 87% lower than 
performance covenant earnings, and FASB-GAAP EBITDA is lower by 
about 10%.172 
At the same time, however, it appears that permissiveness with add-
backs has compensating benefits. Permissiveness improves the 
informativeness of EBITDA-based contract terms like financial covenants. 
Contractual accounting rules for performance covenant earnings are 
generally better at predicting future cash flows than are GAAP measures.173  
 
Addi ional con ac al inno a ion  eme ged o ed ce enego ia ion f ic ion  a  ell. Amend and 
E end  p o i ion  allo  a bo o e  o e end he ma i  of an  con en ing lende  lice of he ndica ed 
loan, bjec  o he e m  of he bo o e  e ension offer, including an increase in rate or fees and/or 
modification of the amortization schedule. This feature enables the borrower and particular lenders to tailor 
their loan slice to the particular circumstances they face, without having to get unanimous consent of lenders, 
a  o ld be c oma . A Refinance Facili  enable  a bo o e  o c ea e an addi ional e m loan anche 
based on an existing credit agreement, provided that the proceeds are used to refinance part of the existing 
loan. This allows the borrower to refinance with a subset of lenders, typically to obtain a lower rate. Without 
such flexibility, the borrower would be required to make any prepayments on a pro rata basis to all existing 
lenders. Berlin, Nini & Yu, supra note 127, at 263 & Online App. 10-11.  
169 Cf. Bratton, supra note 138, at 479 (noting that junior tranches of leveraged loans sold to institutional 
lenders have longer maturities and higher yields and are publicly traded; concluding that public trading 
einfo ce  e i ance o co enan ,  and ha  co -lite terms drive a convergence between the leveraged loan 
and high yield bond markets). 
170 BDDH  ample i  no  clea l  comp i ed onl  of le e aged loan , b  mean spread of their sample is 170 
bps; BDDH, supra note 150, at 26-27 n.22; which suggests that many observations would be considered 
leveraged loans.  
171 Infla ed EBITDA in he n me a o  of a financial a io o e a e  he bo o e  abili  o co e  pcoming 
payment obligations, like fixed charges or interest payments. When inflated EBITDA is in the denominator, 
the ratio understates borrower leverage.  
172 Scott D. Dyreng, Rahul Vashishtha & Joseph Weber, Direct Evidence on the Informational Properties of 
Earnings in Loan Contracts, 55 J. ACCOUNT RES. 371, 373 (2017). 
173 Id. at 374.  
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[N]onrecurring items are often excluded from adjusted EBITDA when 
the firm has previously incurred nonrecurring items, but they are 
included when they are informative of future performance. . . . [S]tudies 
suggest that FASB GAAP does not sufficiently fulfill the informational 
needs of debt contracting parties and the shortcomings are addressed 
through contractual tailoring.174 
 
Badawi, Dyreng, de Fontenay, and Hills (BDDH) create a 
permissiveness index to track seven different categories of add-backs used in 
private loan agreements to augment EBITDA.175 Pe mi i ene  in hi  
context refers not to the magnitudes of EBITDA adjustments, but to the 
adjustment categories below: 
 
x  Non-cash charges  
x  Cash charges for extraordinary or non-recurring items  
x  Cash charges for restructuring  
x  Projected cash savings from synergies, restructurings, etc.  
x  Fees and expense related to acquisitions, investments, equity or debt 
issuances, etc.  
x  Management/advisory fees payable to sponsor  
x  Miscellaneous additional addbacks  
 
Use of an adj men  ca ego  inc ea e  a loan  pe mi i ene  co e b  1. 
Summing up adjustment categories for a loan generates a score between 1 
and 8 for that loan,176 with 1 being the least permissive (no add-back category 
used) and 8 being the most permissive (all seven add-back categories used). 
Mean permissiveness (standard deviation) from their sample is 3.61 (1.74).177 
BDDH find that permissiveness increases with deal size, maturity, leverage, 
and collateral, suggesting more permissive definitions of EBITDA with 
larger and riskier loans.178 BDDH suggest that greater permissiveness begets 
better informativeness to lenders by allowing the borrower to exclude noisy 
information no  eflec i e of he bo o e  ea ning  po en ial o  abili  o 
honor future payment obligations. Add-backs for extraordinary or non-
ec ing i em , fo  e ample, ma  offe  a clea e  pic e of he bo o e  
future earnings than leaving those extraordinary charges unaddressed.179 
 
174 Id. at 376. It also appears that conservative accounting for earnings, once thought to be useful for lenders 
in mitigating downside risk, induces too many false positive violations, which fail to predict future distress 
and instead trigger costly renegotiations and inefficient wealth transfers. Id. at 372. 
175 BDDH, supra note 150. 
176 Id. at 57, Appendix C. 
177 Id. at 2. 
178 Badawi, et al., supra note 150, at 19-21 & 45 tbl. 5. 
179 The most common EBITDA adjustments remove transitory earnings items, affecting about one-fifth of 
contracts. Ninzhong Li, Negotiated Measurement Rules in Debt Contracts, 48 J. ACCOUNT. RES. 1103 
(2010); Peter R. Demerjian, Acco n ing S anda d  and Deb  Co enan : Ha  he Balance Shee  App oach  
Led to a Decline in the Use of Balance Sheet Covenants?, 52 J. ACCOUNT. ECON. 178 (2011); Anne Beatty, 
Lin Cheng & Tzachi Zach, Nonrecurring Items in Debt Contracts, 36 CONTEMP. ACCOUNT. RES. 139 (2019). 
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Also, rather than assuming standardized financial covenants, BDDH use a 
mix of machine learning techniques and hand collection to create a dataset 
that captures actual covenant thresholds and realized covenant violations. 
They show that relying on standardized covenant measures risks 
overestimating realized violations, and that the likelihood of overestimating 
a violation increases with the level of permissiveness.180   
BDDH show a number of interesting results. Contractual EBITDA is 
more permissive with accrual volatility, consistent with findings that accruals 
may not otherwise usefully translate into informativeness for lenders with 
e pec  o bo o e  financial condi ion.181 Conversely, cash flow volatility 
is negatively associated with permissiveness, suggesting that cash flow 
ola ili  eflec  ef l info ma ion abo  he bo o e  abili  o hono  i  
payment obligations. 
Permissiveness is also increasing in the ex ante costs of renegotiation. 
Covenant violations may be costly to the parties, so they have incentive to 
con ac  in a a  ha  igge  a iola ion onl  hen he bo o e  
performance signals actual deterioration. Especially when renegotiation costs 
are high, as with institutional leveraged loan tranches, reducing the incidence 
of false positive violations is key.182 
Consistent with the improved informativeness that high permissiveness 
brings, the market response to a covenant violation with high permissiveness 
is more severe than with low permissiveness, since the violation is less likely 
o be a fal e po i i e and mo e likel  o eflec  he bo o e  e distress. 
The equity market reaction to a covenant violation is therefore more negative 
when permissiveness is high.183 Moreover, permissiveness is negatively 
related to both covenant slack and covenant violations. That is, covenants are 
tighter and false positive violations are fewer.184 This suggests that 
pe mi i ene  imp o e  he ignal o lende  conce ning he bo o e  e 
condition by removing less informative features of accounting earnings from 
the EBITDA definition contracted for in the loan agreement. Finally, credit 
spreads also increase with permissiveness, suggesting that lenders may 
charge for the risk of false negatives.185 
 
180 BDDH, supra note 150, at 28-30 & 50 tbl. 9. 
181 Patricia M. Dechow & Ilia D. Dichev, The Quality of Accruals and Earnings: The Role of Accrual 
Estimation Errors, 77 ACCT G REV. 35 (2002). 
182 BDDH, supra note 150, at 27-28 & 38 fig. 2.  
183 Id. at 23-25 & 48 tbl. 7. 
184 Id. at 4. 
185 Id. at 25-27 & 49 tbl. 8. One potential caveat is that indices are often tricky to interpret. Capturing the 
specific mechanisms that drive empirical results based on indices is sometimes a fraught endeavor. With the 
BDDH permissiveness index, for example, equal weighting may be a convenient default position, but it offers 
a somewhat blunt metric to capture the interesting results they find. Magnitudes of add-backs within specific 
categories, or other prospective mechanisms, for instance, may help capture additional nuance. 
Almost two decades into the debates over dueling corporate governance indices, for example, scholarly 
consensus on what matters for corporate governance remains elusive. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM) 
proposed the first widely debated governance index the G-index which relies on twenty-four equally 
weighted governance features, attempting to measure governance quality and the degree of managerial 
entrenchment. GIM found a significant inverse correlation between management entrenchment and firm 
value and pe fo mance, ing Tobin  Q, ock e n , and ope a ing pe fo mance a  hei  dependen  
variables. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
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C. The Turn Toward Efficient Covenants 
At first blush, weaker covenants may seem like a bad idea. They may 
encourage moral hazard, leaving borrowers too free to take ill-advised risks 
and bl n ing lende  abili  o  incen i e o moni o . Strict covenants, on the 
other hand, offer responsive tripwires to alert the lender when the borrower  
performance deteriorates or it strays toward a risky path. Regular feedback in 
this regard may enable both lender and borrower to gain new information 
about each other and set expectations about the future of he bo o e  
business. This information acquisition and expectation setting will be 
especially useful for new lending relationships.186 
At the same time, however, strict covenants come with costs. They 
con ain he bo o e  la i de o n i  b ine  ex ante,187 and they 
require more regular lender intervention ex post, since violations become 
more frequent.188 Granted, waiver is the most common response, but even 
ha  e i e  ac ion on he lende  pa . Generally, the lender must 
investigate, decide on the severity of the violation, negotiate with the 
borrower, and then document the resolution. Over the life of a loan, the task 
of managing violations of varying severity may not be worth the candle. 
Ultimately, the lender simply seeks to guard against the prospect of the 
bo o e  pa men  defa l . Parties to loan agreements may pursue optimal 
covenants to minimize these costs. 
Over the last few decades, covenants have evolved. Balance sheet 
covenants have become more scarce relative to cash flow covenants in private 
 
Q.J. ECON. 107, 144 (2003) (finding a relationship between an index of corporate governance measures and 
stock performance during the 1990s). Bebch k, Cohen, and Fe ell (BCF) c i ici ed GIM  finding , 
a e ing in ead ha  onl  i  of GIM  en -four governance features mattered. Those six features make 
p BCF  E-index; for them, the other features are just noise. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, & Allen Ferrell, 
What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 738 (2008). Other governance indices and 
criticism of the G-index and the E-index followed. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, 
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns?: An Examination of Firm Operating Performance and 
Investor Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 685 (2006) (challenging GIM  finding  on ock e n ); Sanjai 
Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 257 (2008) (finding 
no correlation between governance measures and stock returns for either the G-index or E-index); Miroslava 
Straska & H. Gregory Waller, Antitakeover Provisions and Shareholder Wealth: A Survey of the Literature, 
49 J. FIN. QUANT. ANALYS. 933 (2014) (arguing that the eighteen measures BCF would drop from the G-
index predict takeover likelihood); Jonathan M. Karpoff, Robert J. Schonlau & Eric W. Wehrly, Do Takeover 
Defense Indices Measure Takeover Deterrence?, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2359 (2017) (proposing an index using 
instrumented versions of the G-index and E-index that predict takeover likelihood). 
186 Nicolae Garleanu & Jeffrey Zwiebel, Design and Renegotiation of Debt Covenants, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 
749 (2009). The new lender may later relax covenants as the borrowing relationship generates new 
information about the borrower. Id.; Wouter Dessein, Information and Control in Ventures and Alliances, 60 
J. FIN. 2513 (2005).  
187 Smith & Warner, supra note 1, at 123-24. 
188 Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, Debt Covenants and Renegotiation, 2 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 95 
(1992); Garleanu & Zwiebel, supra note 186; Valeri V. Nikolaev, Scope for Renegotiation in Private Debt 
Contracts, 65 J. ACCOUNT. & ECON. 270, 274 (noting the tradeoff with renegotiation, which enables 
monitoring of the borrower, but also allows the lender to interfere with management decisions and hold up 
he fi m  in e men ). 
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debt contracts.189 Peter Demerjian hypothesizes that changes in accounting 
standard setting have contributed to making the balance sheet less useful for 
loan contracting.190 Standard setting shifted focus from the determination of 
net income to the valuation of assets and liabilities (the balance sheet 
approach), and new accounting standards emerged. With this balance sheet 
approach came balance sheet adjustments, which embrace estimates of asset 
and liability values, as well as discretion in the timing of recognition of 
changes in value, among other things. These adjustments may limit the utility 
of balance sheets for debt contracting parties, who rely on conservative 
balance sheets and high verifiability in determining the lower bound of a 
fi m  liquidation value. Not all adjustments can be verifiably measured.191 
Error or bias may result.192  
 The turn away from balance sheet covenants has been auspicious. Cash 
flow covenants turn out to be more efficient than balance sheet covenants. 
Cash flow covenants trigger false positives where the borrower violates but 
only a low likelihood of distress exists far less often than balance sheet 
covenants. Griffin, Nini, and Smith (GNS) confirm the trend toward cash 
flow covenants and away from balance sheet covenants that Demerjian 
identifies, as well as showing the relative efficiency of cash flow 
covenants.193 O e  GNS  en -year sample period, the use of balance 
sheet covenants has given way to cash flow covenants, as Figure 2 shows. 




189 Demerjian, supra note 179. In 1996, more than 80% of deals included balance sheet covenants. By 2007, 
balance sheet covenant usage had dropped to 32%. Cash flow covenants showed no similar declining trend. 
Id. 
190 Demerjian is careful not to overclaim. There may be other factors that also affect the observed changes in 
covenant use. Id. at 196.  
191 For example, new standards include wider use of fair value accounting. But one form of fair value 
accounting allows for unobservable inputs into the valuation. Id. at 182. 
192 In addition, researchers have offered evidence that managers use discretion opportunistically across a 
number of accounting contexts. Jennifer Francis, J. Douglas Hanna & Linda Vincent, Causes and Effects of 
Discretionary Asset Write-Offs, 34 J. ACCOUNT. RES. 117 (1996); Edward J. Riedl, An Examination of Long-
Lived Asset Impairments, 79 ACCOUNT. REV. 823 (2004); Anne Beatty & Joseph Weber, Accounting 
Discretion in Fair Value Estimates: An Examination of SFAS 142 Goodwill Impairments, 44 J. ACCOUNT 
RES. 257 (2006); Karthik Ramanna & Ross L. Watts, Evidence on the Use of Unverifiable Estimates in 
Required Goodwill Impairment, 17 REV. ACCOUNT. STUD. 749 (2012); Patricia M. Dechow, Linda A. Myers 
& Catherine Shakespeare, Fair Value Accounting and Gains from Asset Securitizations: A Convenient 
Earnings Management Tool with Compensation Side-Benefits, 49 J. ACCOUNT. & ECON. 2 (2010). 
193 Thomas P. Griffin, Greg Nini & David C. Smith, Losing Control?: The 20-Year Decline in Loan Covenant 
Restrictions 3, Working Paper (Dec. 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3277570. 
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 FIGURE 2: BALANCE SHEET AND CASH FLOW FINANCIAL COVENANTS194 
The figure plots the annual mean fraction of loans that contain a financial covenant based on 
a balance sheet item (red) and based on a cash flow item (blue). We classify covenants as 
cash flow if they are written on EBITDA and balance sheet otherwise. The groups are not 
mutually exclusive because loan packages often contain more than one covenant.  
 
 
Financial covenants have also become less restrictive, as captured in 
Figure 3. The number of financial covenants for a given loan has decreased 
roughly by half in the two decades from 1997 to 2017. The remaining 
covenants are more than twice as slack as covenants two decades prior in 
terms of distance to the covenant threshold at origination. Even revolver-only 
leveraged loan packages show less restrictive covenants.195 Reported 
violations are correspondingly fewer: the annual proportion of public firms 




194 Griffin, Nini & Smith, supra note 193, at 42 fig. 4. 
195 Id.at 30. 
196 Id. at 1 & 40 fig. 2. 
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The figure plots the annual mean number of covenants (blue line, measured on left axis) and 
the annual mean number of standard deviations to violation for the tightest covenant (red 
line, measured on right axis) at contract origination. The sample is a large set of loans in 
Dealscan issued to U.S. nonfinancial firms in Compustat.  
 
 
This shift to less restrictive covenants is driven by removal of the less 
informative balance sheet covenants, relying instead on the more efficient 
cash flow covenants. GNS show a secular decline in false positives, without 
a large increase in false negatives.198 So although the overall use of covenants 
has declined, covenants seem to be more discriminating in differentiating 
distress from non-distress situations. Violations that result only in a waiver 
( efe ed o a  foo  fa l ) are also far more prevalent in the early part of 
the sample period. In 1997, foot faults account for almost two-thirds of new 
covenant violations. By 2016, foot faults are closer to one-third of new 
violations. Overall, balance sheet covenants were also 40% more likely to 
result in foot faults than cash flow covenants.199  
The trends toward lower ex ante covenant strictness and fewer ex post 
iola ion  eem o be d i en b  lende  e ol ion o co enan  c e  i h 
highe  ignal-to-noi e  a ios. The optimal covenant threshold will be tighter 
as the probability of distress increases, and looser in the relative costs of false 
 
197 Griffin, Nini & Smith, supra note 193, at 39 fig. 1. 
198 A false negative in this context arises when a borrower becomes distressed without having triggered a 
covenant violation. 
199 Id. at 4. 
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positives to false negatives.200 In this way, financial covenants can better 
differentiate healthy from distressed borrowers. 
These trends do not appear to be driven by changes in renegotiation 
costs related to changes in the number or type of corporate lenders (i.e., bank 
versus non-bank institutional lenders) or the growth of cov-lite loans. GNS 
uncover no evidence that the presence of leveraged loans, loans marketed to 
institutional investors, private equity deals, improved credit quality, or 




In this Article, I have explained the rise of the leverage loan market 
and eg la o  conce n  abo  e ce i e i k in ha  ma ke . Eigh -five 
percent of leveraged loans are covenant-lite: they contain no financial 
maintenance covenants. Reported covenant violations have dropped. This 
seeming dearth of guardrails in a risky market implicates both systemic risk 
and corporate governance concerns. The new lender governance described 
above, however, offers interesting new avenues for addressing both systemic 
risk concerns and governance. Lenders seem to have innovated in three 
important ways to curb risk and facilitate renegotiation by resort to private 
ordering in loan agreements. 
With split control rights, the informativeness of EBITDA add-backs, 
and the general turn to efficient covenants, it appears that borrowers and 
lenders have created innovative covenant structures to address their own 
private interests, as well as eg la o  fea  of unsound lending practices. In 
deals that include split control rights, bank lenders and only the bank 
lenders enjoy discretion to apply, renegotiate, or waive traditional financial 
maintenance covenant constraints with respect to all loans that are part of the 
deal. Placing this discretion with the bank lenders reduces holdout problems 
and facilitates renegotiation. The advent of split control strongly suggests that 
traditional financial covenants will continue to matter in the leveraged loan 
market. Leveraged and cov-lite loans will not be bereft of financial covenant 
constraints. Instead, traditional covenants from bank revolving credit 
agreements will cabin risk taking. Covenant coverage will not disappear. In 
this respect, the new governance closely replicates the function of the old 
governance. Given the new learning on split control rights, merely tallying 
the number of cov-lite loans and the volume of cov-lite loan dollars would 
seem to tell regulators and rating agencies little about systemic risk. Instead, 
analysts need to discern covenant structures from the deal perspective in 
order to appreciate borrower fi m  o e all co enan  con ain . 
That said, the loans at issue are still below-investment grade, many 
sporting under-reported leverage ratios based on deal-related add-backs.202 
 
200 Id. at 2. 
201 Id. at 4-5, 31. More generally, the secular trend that GNS identify does not focus solely on the leveraged 
loan market.  
202 See supra notes 142-144 and accompanying text. 
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So while the fear of flying may be assuaged somewhat, it will likely not soon 
dissipate. At the same time, add-backs do not necessarily represent 
unmitigated profligacy. Though the leveraged loan market offers real risks of 
excessive leverage, more permissiveness with add-backs appears to improve 
informativeness, generating better predictions of future cash flows related to 
financial covenants. Bespoke contractual accounting rules for financial 
covenant earnings predict future cash flows more reliably than GAAP 
measures. One result is tighter covenants with fewer false positive violations. 
More generally, with the secular trend toward looser and more efficient 
covenants, based on cash flow covenants instead of balance sheet covenants, 
covenants have become more efficient. Covenants with higher signal to noise 
benefit lenders and borrowers alike, hitting a tripwire only when the firm is 
near distress, and reducing costs overall.  
Together these evolving trends suggest that private innovations in 
lending arrangements may reduce risk in leveraged lending markets, facilitate 
lower-cost renegotiation, and improve lender governance. Reg la o  
worries about excessive risk in the leveraged loan market may be overblown 
insofar as they overlook the sophisticated loan structures emerging to address 
lender governance concerns and to avoid renegotiation frictions. 
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